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IN THE SUPRE~!E COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. T. CHAl\1BERS, , 
Case No. Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant~ I 
vs. 9554 
R. W. SIMS, , 
> Defendant and Appellant, 
vs. 
lVIARGARET S. CHAMBERS, 
Cross-Defendant N Respondent. 
Case No. 
9556 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND CROSS APPELLANT IN 9554, 
WHO IS APPELLANT IN 9556 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Third District Court 
of Salt Lake County, Honorable Merrill C. Faux pre-
siding, wherein the Court entered judgment for the 
plaintiff and against the defendant and in favor of the 
cross defendant in an action for partnership accounting. 
Plaintiff and defendant were general partners in 
the South East Ready Mixed Concret Company for 
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some 12 years. Cross-Defendant is the wife of the 
plaintiff and sister of defendant and was active in the 
business during the entire time. Her duties were multi-
farious and included handling orders, supervising rec-
ords, collecting accounts, and running the office gen-
erally. Much of the trial was devoted to consideration 
of the duties, authority and functioning of Mrs. Cham-
bers. 
The partnership was formed May 8, 1948, as a 
limited partnership (Exhibit 11-D) and terminated 
when an Agreement of Dissolution was entered into 
(Exhibit 10-D) . This action was instituted to recover 
from defendant the sum of money indicated on the 
capital accounts of the partners' records before division 
of net profits. Defendant filed a counterclaim and inter-
pleaded Mrs. Chambers, alleging a different theory of 
compensation of partners and charging cross-defendant 
with faulty. record keeping. 
More specifically, the complaint alleged that the 
practice of the partners had been to recognize claims 
for salaries of the plaintiff and cross-defendant before 
division of the net profits equally between the plaintiff 
and defendant; that annual information tax returns 
have been filed on that basis; that the final balance sheet 
had been made up to the time of the dissolution and 
requesting determination of the partnership agreement; 
that the books and records are binding upon the partners 
and that they are bound by the annual statement of 
profits and division thereof and that in the dissolution, 
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capital accounts be paid off according to their balances 
as shown in the records and for a final accounting be-
tween the partners ( R. 1 to 9) . 
The lengthy answer, counterclaim and cross-claim 
challenged the sufficiency of the books and records, set 
up a different theory of the agreement between the 
partners for compensation, charged the cross-defendant 
with improper record keeping and sought corrections 
in the books and records, payment of salaries to the 
defendant, reduction of salaries to the plaintiff and cross-
defendant and for settlement of the accounting in ac-
cordance with the claims of defendant. (R. 19 to 30). 
Interrogatories were submitted and answered after 
appeal to the Court for assistance, and depositions were 
taken and concluded in the same manner, all engender-
ing bad feelings and mistrust. 
The accountants of the parties worked together 
and reconciled all accounting differences except the 
issue of salaries. The pre-trial order noted the success 
of the accountants in reducing the issues, noted the 
claim of defendant for $48,900.00 additional salaries 
and that there would be a contest on every salary and 
every partnership distribution entry in the books and 
as to entries which should have been made and were 
not made. Defense of the Statute of Limitations as to 
the claims of defendant was noted, and the Court gave 
a starting place for the settlement of accounts between 
the parties by giving balance sheet figures as agreed by 
the accountants and leaving the issue of salaries to be 
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determined. The pre-trial order also required the fur-
nishing of certain information by each party to 'the 
others and denied the motion of cross-defendant for 
dismissal as to her ( R. 86 to 88) . 
When the case came on for trial, extensive opening 
statements were made by both sides (R. 255 to 292). 
During the course of the opening statements, defendant 
suggested that reasonableness of salaries could be elimi-
nated as an issue (R. 265, 283, 287, 288). Plaintiff 
suggested that reasonableness was an issue but thought 
it could be elilninated and would save much time (R. 
289 to 290) . This was because the plaintiff thought 
salaries were established in specific amounts by the 
books and records, and the defendant thought salaries 
were specifically established by an oral agreement 
allegedly made in 1948. 
In any event, a very lengthy trial was held and 
theoretically reasonableness of salary claims was elimi-
nated from the trial, followed by a memorandum deci-
sion (R. 148 to 150). 
The memorandum decision found partially in favor 
of the plaintiff but held that the salaries shown on the 
records had not been sufficiently communicated to the 
defendant, although there had been acquiescence and 
approval by the parties of allowance of salaries to 
the plaintiff and cross-defendant with no salary to the 
defendant subsequent to 1948 and with equal division 
of profits after salaries. The decision held that the de-
fendant failed on his counterclaim (R. 150). This 
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meant further trial to determine the amount of salary 
allowable to the plaintiff under all the circumstances. 
:Following the second trial, the Court made a deci-
sion allowing plaintiff less by $22,000.00 than the books 
had shown and giving judgment for the plaintiff against 
the defendant of $29,314.66 and requiring defendant 
to account for $1,196.58 additional (R. 190). 
The defendant appealed from this judgment, and 
the plaintiff filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal and on 
appeal raising restricted issues (R. 227 and 226). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts made by appellant at 
pages 2 to 10 is rejected in its entirety. This statement 
ignores the decisions, findings, conclusions and judg-
ment of the District Court, ignores the evidence of 
plaintiff and assumes that this Court is compelled to 
find in accordance with the desires of the defendant if 
any evidence can be found which will support the de-
fendant's theory. 
Because of the confusion arising from referring to 
the parties as appellant or cross-appellant or respondent 
in one capacity or the other, parties will be referred to 
as they were in the District Court. 
The facts before this Court are primarily those 
stated by the Court in its memorandum decisions and 
found by the Court in its findings of fact. These must 
be accepted by this Court as the facts if they are sup-
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ported by any substantial evidence. (Jewell v. Horner, 
(U. 2d 1962) 366 P. 2d 594; Lowe v. Rosenlof, (U. 
2d, 1962) 364 P. 2d 418; Valcarce v. Bitters, ) U. 2d 
1961) 362 P. 2d 427.) 
In its first memorandum decision (R. 148-150), 
the Court found: 
1. The May 8, 1949, ( 1948) articles defined the 
obligations of the parties; 
2. Salaries as contended by the defendant were 
discussed, but never became operative; 
3. The interest of the limited partner descended to 
his three children, and the plaintiff and defendant were 
thereafter treated as equal general partners with an 
outstanding interest in a third child not a party to this 
action, recognizing that they might compensate them-
selves for services. 
4. Cross-defendant's salary w·as combined with 
plaintiff's as part of plaintiff's earnings. 
5. The practice was established after 1951 to allow 
plaintiff on the books compensation for his full time 
services, also his wife's, and of allowing defendant noth-
ing after 1951 until he claimed $2500.00 salary in 1959. 
6. It was not a sufficiently consistent relationship 
between labor and profits to be binding upon defendant 
or to enable the Court to finally determine the capital 
standings of the partners ; 
7. The relationship of confidence between defend-
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ant and cross-defendant required a more complete dis-
closure of salary allowances than the evidence shows ; 
8. The capital accounts in the books and records 
were not adopted by the parties ; 
9. Paragraph 4 of the pre-trial order requires de-
termination of all issues, necessitating further evidence 
as to reasonable compensation in order to determine 
final capital standings, which must be done by stipula-
tion, by appointment of master in chancery or other-
Wise; 
10. Statutes of Limitations are not a defense to 
either party; 
11. Plaintiff's motion for dismissal of the counter-
claim is granted. 
After further motions, notices, hearings and orders 
(R. 51 toR. 174), a further trial was held, and a sup-
plemental memorandum decision was entered (R. 181-
183). 
This memorandum decision adjusted all of the 
factors and equities and allowed plaintiff compensation 
that would be reasonable under the circumstances, the 
amount allowed to the top man for 48 hours per week, 
without any additional allowances or overtime or extra-
ordinary services and not exceeding in any year the 
amount claimed for plaintiff's services on the partner-
ship books. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment were prepared in accordance with these two 
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decisions resulting in judgment as indicated (R. 184 to 
191) 0 
A 25 page Motion of Objections to the Findings 
of Fact and Motion to Amend the Findings was filed 
by the defendant, (R. 192 to 216) and a motion to 
amend was also filed by the plaintiff -(R. 218-220). The 
Court denied both motions in toto, holding that they 
may be considered Motions for New Trial upon stipu-
lation of the parties, which 1\'Iotions for New Trial were 
denied ( R. 222) . 
Notice of appeal was given by the defendant (R. 
232-232A) and Notice of Appeal was given by the 
plaintiff (R. 231). The Plaintiff filed a Statement of 
Points on Appeal limited to the following points: 
1. The books and records are binding on the parties. 
2. The allowable salaries and withdrawals of the 
partners are those shown on the books and records. 
3. Judgment in favor of plaintiff should be in-
creased by $22,018.00 (R. 226). 
Plaintiff's Cross Appeal raised the following 
points: 
1. Defendant abandoned the salary agreement 
contended for by defendant and it was modified or 
waived. 
2. The claim is barred by Section 78-12-25, U.C.A. 
1953. 
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3. Any claim of defendant based on fraud, con-
cealment or deceit is barred by Section 78-12-26, sub-
section (3), U.C.A. 1953. 
4. By their practices the salaries on the partner-
ship books and records have been established. 
Because of the length of the record and the numer-
ous subpoints raised by the brief of defendant, and the 
several subpoints under which the argument of this brief 
will be made, and in order to avoid repetition of refer-
ences to the evidence, specific references to the evidence 
will be made in the argument of each point. It is be-
lieved that this method will be most useful to the Court. 
Plaintiff does not follow the points of the argument as 
contained in defendant's brief as not seeming logical 
or the actual issues before this Court. 
POINTS OF ARG·UMENT 
POINT I 
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS MAY BE 
MODIFIED BY IMPLIED AGREEMENT OR 
ACQUIESCENCE. 
A. The Partnership Agre,ment of May 8, 1948, 
provides for compensation before division of 
profits. 
B. The allowance of compensation for the partners 
became a matter of agreement by practice. 
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POINT II 
TI-IE PARTIES ADOPTED THE BOOKS 
AND RECORDS AS THEY WERE KEPT. 
A. No salary for Sims was claimed or recognized 
after 1948 until the $2500.00 in 1959. 
B. Defendant was amply notified of the salaries 
practices and acquiesced therein. 
POINT III 
WAS REASONABLENESS A PROPER 
ISSUE? 
A. It was within the pleadings and Pre-Trial 
Order. 
B. Defendant suggested at the opening of the trial 
that it be eliminated. 
C. The possibility that both might fail in their 
claims of specific compensation was recognized. 
D. The Court had the right to hear the further 
issue and complete the case. 
E. If reasonableness was a proper issue_, the 
Courfs decision was supported by evidence and 
is sound. 
10 
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POINT IV 
DEFENDANT IS BARRED ON HIS COUN-
TERCLAIM BY THE STATUTES OF LIMI-
TATIONS. 
A. Claim for salaries is barred by Section 78-12-25, 
UCA. 1953. 
B. Action for salary based on fraud_, concealment 
or deceit is barred by Section 78-12-26 (3) 
UCA. 1953. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS MAY BE 
MODIFIED BY IMPLIED AGREEMENT OR 
ACQUIESCENCE. 
A. The Partnership Agreement of May 8, 1948, 
provides for compensation before division of 
profits. 
Plaintiff recognizes that Section 48-1-15 ( 6) must 
be satisfied. In his brief, defendant cites the statute as 
saying: 
"No partner is entitled to remuneration for 
acting in the partnership business." (Brief P. 
10 and 19). 
There is no dispute that this is the rule "in the absence 
of other agreement," which is the preamble to that sub-
section of the statute. 
The cases relied on by defendant plainly state the 
11 
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correct rule to be that the statute applies only "in the 
absence of an express or implied agreement" or "unless 
there was an express agreement or provision for such 
remuneration." (Vangel vs. Vangel, 254 P. 2d 919, at 
page 17 of Brief and Keller vs. vVixom, 123 U. 102, 
255 P. 2d 119, at page 19 of Brief). 
At the threshold, the written Certificate of Limited 
Partnership (Exhibit 11-D), Paragraph XII, pro-
vided in part: 
" * * * that the general partners shall have 
the sole n1anagement of the business and business 
activities, and shall be entitled to compensate 
themselves for their services as an expense of op-
eration of the business before computation of 
profits, to the extent that such compensation for 
services of General Partners is reasonable under 
the circumstances. */ * * " 
And paragraph XIII contemplated that the compen-
sation might be unequal by providing: 
"That the General Partners at the present 
time are equal partners and shall share equally 
in the profits; provided, that their interest shall 
be: · readjusted as they make additional contri-
butions to the partnership in property, money. 
or services, or by adjustment of property values 
by mutual agreement." 
The Court in its first memorandum decision held: 
I. That the Articles of Limited Partnership de-
fined the obligations; 
4. That the parties departed from the terms of the 
agreement by their practices; 
12 
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5. By compensating Chambers for full-time serv-
ices and allowing Sims nothing for services after 1951 
and until 1959; 
6, 7, and 8. That the practices did not establish 
the a1nount of compensation to which plaintiff was en-
titled; and 
9. That paragraphs XII and XIII of the agree-
ment make "reasonable compensation for Chambers' 
services" determinable and required further trial (R. 
148-150). 
This ruling was a disappointment to both parties. 
Plaintiff had contended that the specific salaries shown 
on the books had been adopted by the parties ; and the 
defendant had contended that the parties made an oral 
agreement on 1\tlay 8, 1948, which the Court should have 
honored. 
In effect, the Court holds that the bookkeeping 
entries established the salaries except for the confiden-
tial relationship existing between the cross-defendant 
and defendant, which required a more complete and 
specific disclosure than the acquiescence or adoption 
which resulted from general practices. In other words, 
"reasonable under the circumstances" as provided in 
Paragraph XII of the Limited Partnership Agreement 
is the agreement of the parties upon which the trial 
court relied. 
B. The allowance of compensation for the partners 
became a matter of agreement by practice. 
i3 
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During the preliminary discussion of the case, the 
defendant admitted that practices of the partners could 
establish a new agreement (R. 267). And the Court 
indicated that this was his view of the law (R. 267, 282, 
283, 295) . But the Court in this case has he~d that the 
written agreement satisfies the statute and establishes 
certain practices that go part way towards fixing the 
compensation but does not establish specific amounts, 
and that the written agreement, providing for "reason-
able compensation" enables the Court to determine that. 
We have researched this rather narrow question 
with the following results: 
An annotation at 66 ALR 2d 1023 is on the sub-
ject: "Construction and effect of agreement relating 
to salary of partners." At page 1027 the question we 
are here interested in is considered, and this general 
statement is made: 
"Where a partnership agreement clearly con-
templates the payment of salary to one or more 
partners, but no amounts are specified, a number 
of cases recognize the presumption that the con-
tracting partners intended the payment of rea-
sonable salaries." 
In Koehler vs. Hunter, 166 Ark. 27,265 SW, 972, 
973~ the partnership agreement provided that until the 
company was ready to do business Paul Koehler was 
not to receive any salary or other compensation for his 
services. Koehler testified that before he undertook the 
work, he advised the parties that he was going to charge 
a salary of $400.00 per month for running the plant, 
14 
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and that the matter was mentioned at a later time, and 
there was no objection. The Court ruled that the agree-
ment contemplated compensation after the plant was 
in operation but had doubts as to whether an amount 
was agreed on and said: 
"If no amount was agreed upon, appellant 
should have been allowed a reasonable salary for 
his services from June 1, 1920, until November 
1, 1921. According to the weight of the evidence, 
appellant devoted most of his time to the man-
agement and control of the business, and it was 
contemplated between the parties that he should 
be recompensed for his services. The record fails 
to show what his services were reasonably worth." 
and the case was remanded for determinaa tion of the 
reasonable value. 
In Ziebak v. Nasser (1938) 12 Cal. 2d 1, 82 P. 2d 
375, one partner told the others the theatre managers 
would be paid $100.00 per week and then undertook 
management. The plaintiff made no protests, and the 
management proceeded. The Court found that $100.00 
per week was a reasonable salary and competitive to 
the salaries paid to other theatre managers and allowed 
that amount of compensation before division of profits. 
Jones v. Jones (1934) 254 Ky. 475,71 SW 2d, 999, 
1002, was a bitter case involving four brothers whose 
friendly partnership ended in acrimony and litigation. 
One of the partners managed the farm, and the Court 
said: 
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.''We think it was agreed that he shoul~ have 
the active management of the part~ership. an~ 
should be paid a reasonable sum for his serY_Ices. 
Shulkin v. Shulkin, 301 Mass. 184, 16 NE 2d 644, 
118 ALR 629, is similar to the principal case. The 
partnership was established by three brothers by oral 
agreement, two of whom were to give full time to the 
business and were to draw salaries while the other was 
not. The oral agreement was that the two brothers 
were to draw salaries of $35.00 and $45.00 per week, 
and the third brother said: "That they were to draw 
enough to get along on." The third brother didn't know 
how much they were drawing but assumed they were 
drawing more than the sum originally agreed on and 
the larger amounts of $80.00 and $70.00 actually being 
drawn were accurately recorded in the account book. 
(This is similar to the defendant here, who knew that 
while he was at Kearns Mr. Chambers drew an increased 
salary because of his discussion with Beckstrom). ( Ab. 
121, 136, R. 1040, 1132). The Court held that allow-
ance of the recorded salaries was appropriate, saying: 
"The right of a partnership for compensation 
of his services depends wholly upon agreement, 
express or implied. * * * (citing cases). The 
entire facts reported warrant the conclusion that 
the salary rates rested upon agreement and that 
their amounts were not unreasonable." 
And the Court went on to say that allowance of salaries 
during periods of disability was erroneous and that 
charging partners for amounts in excess of their regular 
salaries was proper. 
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The only case on the questoin we have found, which 
is later than the annotation, is McBride vs. Fitzpatrick 
(Oregon 1960) 356 P. 2d 947 at 952. In that case Fitz-
patrick testified that he and McBride had an under-
standing that Fitzpatrick would be entitled to a reason-
able amount for living expenses until McBride became 
active in the partnership business. McBride testified 
that he did not recall any such conversation. The part-
nership agreement provided: 
"That I, Ervin P. McBride, will not expect 
to receive any remuneration until such time that 
I am putting in full time exclusively with :Fitz-
patrick Lincoln Mercury and Fitzpatrick l\1:il-
waukee Auto Sales." 
And McBride admitted that when he commenced active 
participation in the business, each partner was to draw 
$60.00 per week. The Court said: 
"From these circumstances, we believe that it 
is reasonable to infer that the parties intended 
to permit Fitzpatrick to make a reasonable with-
drawal for living expense during the time he 
was operating the Bend business without Mc-
Bride's assistance. The provision of the partner-
ship agreement set out above lends support to 
this inference. The agreement made after Mc-
Bride joined Fitzpatrick in Bend permitting the 
former to draw $60 a week is additional ground 
for inferring that the original agreement was 
intended to permit similar reasonable withdraw-
als by Fitzpatrick prior to McBride's partici-
pation in the affairs of the partnership. We hold 
that the trial court did not err in allowing a 
salary of $2,600 for the period in question." 
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Under these authorities, the Court properly found 
the practices of the parties as to allowance of compen-
sation before division of profits, and the Court fixed 
"reasonable" compensation from the evidence. This 
assumes, as the Court found and held, that the specific 
amounts were not sufficiently adopted by the partners 
to become fixed. Our second point is that the trial court 
did not go far enough. 
POINT II 
THE PARTIES ADOPTED THE BOOKS 
AND RECORDS AS THEY vVERE KEPT. 
The Court has gone only part way with the plain-
tiff on this point. The Court has held that Sims was 
credited with no salaries after 1948, at the time he went 
to Kearns and that he never got back on the payroll 
until a salary of $2500.00 was entered for him in 1959 
( R. 185-186) . The Court also held in its memorandum 
decision and in its findings that the parties acquiesced 
in and adopted the practice of crediting the plaintiff 
with salary for his full-time services to the partnership 
(R. 149 and 186) but held that the fiduciary capacity 
of cross-defendant and her husband, the plaintiff, called 
for more specific information to be given to the defend-
ant than was shown by the evidence (R. 149 and 186). 
It is the point of plaintiff's appeal that the court erred 
in going only half way. If defendant was charged with 
knowing and acquiescing in and adopting the practice 
of crediting plaintiff ·with regular salaries, then the law 
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fastens upon the defendant the obligation of knowing 
what those salaries were, and since they clearly appeared 
in the records, he is charged with knowing what the 
records contained. 
A. No salary for Sims was claimed or recognized 
after 1948 1JJntil the $2500.00 in 1959. 
The Court found that there was a conversation on 
May 8, 1948, at which salaries of $400.00 and $350.00 
per month were discussed. Mr. Chambers testified that 
this conversation took place months earlier when Ex-
hibit 20P was prepared for Farmers State Bank ( R. 
899), and he didn't ever testify that the amounts agreed 
to were $400.00 and $350.00. Mrs. Chambers, who was 
right with her father the evening of May 8, 1948 (R. 
1536), heard no conversation that evening about salaries 
and testified that the first she heard of such salaries was 
in the taking of her husband's deposition for this case 
(Ab. 64; App. A, para. 13; and R. 603 and 604). 
Defendant has attempted to distort the testimony of 
both of these parties in this regard. 
But regardless of that, the testimony is overwhelm-
ing that defendaint knew that a salary schedule of 
$400.00 for him and $350.00 for plaintiff was never put 
into operation or practice. He saw the $2,000.00 salary 
figure in Book 2-P and discussed it with Mr. Reimann 
and Mrs. Chambers (Ab. 137, R. 1153); he had a con-
versation with Mr. Beckstrom (Ab. 136, R. 1132) con-
cerning the 1951 return (Exhibit 23-D), and knew 
that the salary for Chambers there was $4,778.60 and 
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that there was none for him on the return, and that 
neither of those figured out to the desired amount; he 
knew that when he left the ready mix business in 1948 
and went out to Kearns, he was getting no salary and 
was entitled to none because of his conversation with 
Mrs. Chambers about it. (Ab. 120, R. 1037-1038). 
He knew when he signed Exhibits 63-P and 64-D that 
he had left the business and gone out to Kearns 
and that he was not going to receive any salary willie 
he was there; and he knew that no steps were ever taken 
by him after the Kearns venture was over to get back 
on the payroll. He filed income tax returns every year 
and had a figure from the partnership as to his share of 
the profits and is charged with knowing, particularly 
in the prosperous years, the basis of that computation; 
he did not take the stand to deny receiving notice of 
the income tax deficiency as shown by Exhibits 53-P, 
54-P, 55-P and 56-P from which the Court is entitled 
to draw the inference, which it said it would draw, from 
those circumstances (Ab. 172, R. 1406). Defendant 
did not deny the conversation with Mrs. Chambers in 
March, 1956, when Exhibits 16-P and 17-P were pre-
pared, and he is entitled to neither respect nor credi-
bility when he says that he didn't know that the figures 
of $57,000.00 and of $56,813.00 represented differen-
tials in capital accounts based on wages for Mr. and 
Mrs. Chambers and none for him (Ab. 165, R. 1363-
1364) . Mrs. Chambers testified that he went immedi-
ately to have Jorgensen prepare Exhibit 8, and that 
he came back with Exhibit 8 that same afternoon in 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
order to have his own verification of the difference in 
capital ownership of the two partners. Mr. Shirley 
testified that when he prepared the defendant's 1955 
and 1956 inco1ne tax returns, he had determined how 
the profit was computed and had general discussions 
about that profit with Mr. Sims (R. 459-461, 465), 
although he could not recall a specific conversation in 
which the situation as to salaries was specifically dis-
cussed (R. 45, R. 465). David Beal testified specifically 
that when he conferred with the defendant in the fall 
of 1955 or the first part of 1956 concerning Exhibit 
P-4 and the status of the capital accounts, that de-
fendant: 
" * * *said that I had no right to be dividing 
other people's money without their permission. 
At the time I told him that I had taken the 
books and my understanding I had done just 
what the partnership agreement called for, and 
he in return says that he would take care of 
. Chambers' wages or salary or as he put it, and 
that they would handle dividing the rest, and 
that my services would no longer be needed." 
(R. 319, A b. 19). 
And it is only reasonable to believe that when Russell 
Evans reluctantly testified that he gave information 
each year to Mr. Sims either on a large memorandum 
or on a small slip of paper or over the telephone, that 
he was testifying to the minimal truth. (Our Appendix 
A, para. 48, 50, 51; R. 1436-1438, 1483). 
And when Sims had the chance to testify as to the 
kind of superintendent and manager of the business 
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the· plaintiff had been, he emphasized the fact that his 
home and office overlooked the loading yard (A b. 292, 
R. 2172-2173), that he was aware of all that went on 
there, and that he saw plaintiff innumerable times in 
the yard (Ab. 289, R. 2163). It is utterly inconceivable 
that this defendant, who was in the partnership office 
at least six times a year, would deliberately insulate 
himself against knowledge of partnership affairs to 
the extent of knowing how the business was being run, 
why it was so slow getting into a profit position, and 
how much of his yearly allocation of ordinary income 
for tax purposes was offset by wages for the plaintiff 
and how much division of profit after wages. 
And the defendant's employee Steiner, who ap-
parently knew every entry in the partnership records, 
was asked specifically if he could find any place in the 
partnership records where the salaries of $400.00 and 
$350.00 per month had been used. And Mr. Steiner 
was compelled to answer that he could find no single 
instance. (Our Appendix A, para. 43; R. 1347). 
For defendant now to argue that his practice did 
not accomplish a modification of what he claimed was 
an agreement and what the Court found was a con-
versation about salaries in 1948 is to ignore completely 
the cases which hold that the agreement as to compen-
sation may be implied from the records and the conduct 
of the parties.' Defendant's cases of Vangel vs. ·v .. angel, 
(supra) and Keller vs. Wixom (supra) go that far. 
See the notation at 66 ALR 2d 1023 and cases there 
cited, and the authorities under the next subpoint. 
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B. Defendant was amply notified of the salaries 
practices and acquiesced therein. 
In considering what information the defendant 
had about salaries being credited to the plaintiff, the 
Court must have believed that defendant got excited 
in the fall of 1958 on the theory that he then learned 
for the first time that Chambers was being credited 
with a salary and he was not. The evidence above recited 
is overwhelming against any such contention. Mrs. 
Chambers had recently discussed with Paul Reimann 
the claimed overdraft by Sims (Ab. 172, 195, 196, 
R. 1408, 1550, 1552), and Reimann had presumably 
taken it up with defendant. This caused the defendant 
to send Steiner to the partnership office to make a 
tabulation of capital accounts which he did in Exhibit 
47-P. It was impossible at. that point for defendant 
to be surprised by what Steiner reported to him since 
he had learned the same thing from Mrs. Chambers 
and Mr. Beal more than two years earlier. Steiner 
reported that Mrs. Chambers expected that there would 
be some adjustments in the capital accounts, and this 
took the form of an adjustment of sand and gravel in 
the first part of 1959 evidenced by Exhibit 26-P pre-
pared by Russell Evans. Sims gave "instructions" that 
$2,500.00 of this would be salary for him and that 
that the balance would be in the form of a sand and 
gravel adjustment ·with no salaries thereafter (A b. 176, 
R. 1445). This meant the end of the partnership, which 
shortly came to pass. It was beyond the defendant's 
fondest hope that he would be able to eliminate the 
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plaintiff's long standing salaries or have any success 
whatever in selling to the Court the notion of his $400.00 
and $350.00 claim going back to 1948. The obstructive, 
steamroller, overwhelming tactics of defendant's counsel 
succeeded in cutting $22,000.00 off the salary of the 
plaintiff (R. 188), money which the plaintiff had al-
lowed to accumulate in the business and the benefit of 
which the defendant had reaped over the years while 
keeping his own capital account comparatively low. 
The trial Court has found that the defendant ac-
quiesced in certain practices, including allowance of 
regular salary to· the plaintiff for his full-time effort, 
which salary along with that of the cross-defendant 
was accumulated in the capital account, with no salary 
to defendant. Being charged with that much informa-
tion as a matter of law, the defendant is charged with 
the reasonable implications and details of those matters. 
The trial Court was compelled to permit the defendant 
to put a blindfold on his eyes and ear plugs in his 
ears so that he could say he didn't know what the books 
contained. The law is not that naive. · 
A number of exhibits ·was brought to the attention 
of the defendant during the course of the partnership, 
and on each of those exhibits was contained information 
concerning salary from the partnership for either the 
plaintiff or the defendant or both. And since there is 
no record of any kind in the partnership records or 
produced in this trial which shows a salary for the de-
fendant at $400.00 per month or for the plaintiff for 
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$350.00 per month, as Mr. Sims contended should have 
been the case during all the years ( R. 23) , each of 
these documents constitutes a notice to the defendant 
that the salaries were not being entered in accordance 
with his desires. 
Exhibit 1-P was always available in the office of 
the partnership in its present form or in the form which 
it had from time to time, the salary figures always being 
the same (Ab. 144, R. 1194-1195). 
Exhibit 2-P was the first ledger of the partnership 
and shows only two salaries, namely $2,000.00 for each 
of the plaintiff and the defendant during the year 1948, 
which salaries were deleted as defendant said he kne"r 
(Ab. 121, R. 1040). 
Exhibits 6-P and 7-P were annual statements of 
the partnership which Russell Evans testified were 
supplied to the defendant, by mail, by delivery, by 
abstract or by telephone (Ab. 17.5, R. 1436) .And certain 
it is that defendant obtained the net income figure each 
year for income tax purposes (R. 98). 
Exhibit 8-P was a study of capital accounts show-
ing the disparity of drawings and of capital balances 
for the hvo partners, prepared by Mr . .Jorgensen, de-
fendant's father-in-law, and prepared according to Mrs. 
Chambers at the specific request of the defendant ( Ab. 
56, R. 529). 
Exhibit 13-P is the 1955 partnership income tax 
return prepared by Mr. Shirley (Ab. 36, 38; R. 425, 
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426) with the revised depreciation schedule, which he 
made for the partnership. It is related to Exhibit 19-P, 
which is the an~ual profit and loss statement of the 
partnership for 1955 and which contains adjustment 
figures in accordance with ·the depreciation schedule 
changes. Mr. Shirley then assisted Mr. Sims with his 
own income tax returns for 1955 and the following 
year (A b. 39, R. 428). 
Exhibit 14-P is the partnership information re-
turns for 1956 which were available to Mr. Shirley, 
as he assisted Mr. Sims with his 1956 return. Each of 
these returns has a reconciliation of partners' capital 
accounts and figures of net income for that year as 
follows: Chambers' capital-$109,370.78, income for 
1956-$27,161.75. For Sims-$24,866.66 total capital, 
and $10,781.74 income for that year; with total capital 
at the end of the year in the amount of $137,237.44 for 
Chambers and $37,943.49 for Sims. Mr. Shirley testi-
fied that he was informed as to the income figures and 
the records of the partnership, as an accountant pre-
paring income tax returns should be (not abstracted, 
R. 428, 431, 438) and that he di~cussed the appropriate 
matters with Mr. Sims, including salaries (Ab. 41-44, 
R. 439-444, 447, 453, 461, 465). Although, when he 
was pressed to recall a specific conversation in which 
salaries were specifically discussed, he was unable to 
do so (Ab. 45, R. 465). 
Exhibit 15-P is the study of capital accounts made 
by Russell Evans, (Ab. 54, 174; R. 520, 1421-1422) 
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and which gave rise to the conferences between .1\lrs. 
Chambers and Mr. Si1ns in l\1arch, 1956. (Ab. 54, R. 
518). At this conference also was discussed the figures 
given by Mr. Beal from 4-P of 90ro plus for the 
Chambers' capital and 3Y2ro for the Sims' capital. 15-P 
shows Chambers to own 72ro of the capital of the busi-
ness. It was 15-P and 4-P that led Mrs. Cha~nbers to 
take the matter up with her brother; and at that con-
ference, they made between them Exhibits 16-P and 
17-P partly in the handwriting of each. Mrs. Chambers' 
testimony on this conference appears at Ab. 54-58, R. 
518-533. l\1r. Sims' testimony is at Ab. 128 and 129, 
R. 1081 and 1084. On Exhibit 16-P is seen the circle 
with 90.5ro and 9. ro accompanied by the figure $200,-
000.00 and $180,000.00 and $250,000.00. And on the 
same page are the figures showing the interest of the 
partners as R. 4/9ths, T. 4/9ths and L. 1/9th. There 
was then a recess while according to Mrs. Chambers, 
Exhibit 8-P was obtained by l\1r. Sims from Mr. J or-
gensen and then Exhibit 17-P was written during the 
further conference of the parties. On that appears in 
Mrs. Chambers' handwriting the figures $56,856.15 
and in Mr. Sims' handwriting the figures 57 subtracted 
from $250,000.00 with the remainder again divided in 
two, giving $96,500.00 to which is added the $57,000.00 
to bring Tal's share to $153,500.00, thus showing the 
theory that the unbalanced capital accounts would be 
first deducted from the total assets of the partnership 
and the remainder divided fifty-fifty, which was the 
theory Mr. Sims was demonstrating to Mrs. Chambers. 
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The words "wages M. & T." opposite $56,856.15 were 
written on the page during the conversation, according 
to the testimony of Mrs. Chambers (Ab. 58, R. 541). 
On examination of Mr. Sims, it was plaintiff's counsel 
who was mistaken as to which item was written on 
afterwards. It was the pencil item "would be paid before 
fifty-fifty split" and not the ink item in the same ink 
and written at the same time as the rest of the docu-
ment, ·which g?t plaintiff's counsel off the track at 
Ab. 128, R. 1081. 
Exhibit 18-P ·was another annual statement which 
was presumably delivered to Mr. Sims since that was 
the purpose of preparing them, according to Mr. Evans 
(Ab. 175, R. 1437}. 
Exhibit 21-D was produced by the defendant from 
the partnership files and was identified as a memo-
randum on salaries which was the forerunner of Exhibit 
1-P. This ties in with the conversations that all of the 
parties and Mr. Reimann had with lYir. Beckstrom ( Ab. 
121 and 136, R. 1039 and 1132}. The longhand notation 
at the bottom of the fourth page was put on by Mrs. 
Chambers. it reads: 
"Decrease Rowe's and increase Tal's capital 
for old note, etc." (R. 1565}. 
Mrs. Chambers testified that this was the suggestion 
of Mr. Beckstrom and that she took it up with the 
defendant, and following the conversation, she wrote 
the' next longhand, which reads: 
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"No, Rowe says pay it first, but increase capital 
account for salaries of Tal and Margaret." (Ab. 
193, 197, R. 1539, 1566). 
This testimony indicates that the whole method of 
keeping the capital accounts was discussed with the 
defendant in connection with 21-D and that his sug-
gestion was carried out. Exhibit 23-D reflects this. Mr. 
Sims testified concerning this document that when he 
first saw it there had been no line run through the 
salary for John T. Chambers and that he told her that 
the salaries were a memorandum item only. He was 
not present when the revised income figures were written 
on the returns (Ab. 121, R. 1041-1042, Ab. 164, R. 
1361). It is significant that on this tax return when first 
prepared there was a salary only for John T. Chambers 
and in the amount of $4,778.60 for the year 1951. 
Exhibit 26-P is a memorandum made by Russell 
Evans concerning a meeting with Mr. Sims in January, 
1959. The third page contains Sims' instructions to 
Evans to make an adjustment in sand and gravel in 
a total amount of $11,722.93 spread back over the pre-
vious nine years, and that the adjustment should be 
$9,196.97 for sand and gravel and $2,500.00 for salary. 
The second page has a notation that there is to be no 
salaries from the first of January for the partners until 
further decision, with Rowe to take an active part. The 
first page contained the date of the meeting, J anu-
ary 13, 1959 (Ab. 176, R. 1444). This document plainly 
shows the realization of Sims as of that time that the 
salary differentials were of long standing and were 
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terminated as of January, 1959, until further notice. 
But far from demanding a revision of salaries back 
over the years, he simply made the adjustment in sand 
and gravel and asserted a salary of $2,500.00 for him-
self as part of that adjustment. 
Exhibit 47-P is the study made by Steiner of the 
capital accounts in 1958 with computations at the bot-
tom to indicate that the purpose of the study was to 
consider distribution of assets in the event of disso-
lution. 
Exhibits 53-P, 54-P, 55-P and 56-P were intro-
duced through the witness Russell Evans ( Ab. 170-172, 
R. 1389-1411). Defendant refused to produce any 
records relating to this adjustment of tax for the years 
1952, 1953, and 1954, which resulted in a net over-
assessment and refund. Exhibit 53-P was sent to Mr. 
Evans and called for execution of Forms 870 by both 
of the partners. It will be noted that the second page 
of this exhibit schedules the distribution of income for 
those three years as between Sims and Chambers and 
shows for 1952 $2,764.90 as against $8,167.88 for 
Chambers; for 1953 $4,731.98 as against $9,463.68 for 
Chambers; and for 1954 $9,825.60 as against $22,241.84 
for Cha1nbers. Exhibit 54-P ·was subsequently sent to 
the partnership acknowledging the agreement of the 
taxpayer, and indicating that both partners had ex-
ecuted the respective forms 870. This exhibit contains 
schedules for each of the years showing the adjustments 
to the distribution of the income from the South East 
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Ready lVIixed partnership. Exhibit 55-P is the report 
sent to Chambers individually and showing the de-
ficiency and penalty and the adjustments to income for 
Chambers individually. Exhibit 56-P is the covering 
page from a similar statement sent to the defendant 
and his wife and produced from the files of defendant. 
Defendant refused to produce the rest of the report, 
but 56-P was admitted as raising an inference that the 
balance of 56-P would be like 55-P and that both were 
tied in to the Form 870 and the original preliminary 
report and the final report which are 53-P and 54-P. 
Both 53-P and 54-P contain on the same pages the 
cmnparative incomes for the two partners for those 
three years. In admitting these exhibits the Court said: 
"You have it within your power to disprove 
this if it is false." (Ab. 172-R. 1406). 
And it is of some significance that defendant offered no 
evidence from the Internal Revenue Department or 
from his own files or any testimony of his own to dis-
prove the inference that he had received these reports 
and been cognizant of the comparative income figures 
for those three years of the two partners. 
It is of significance also that the income tax figures 
reporting income from the partnership by the defendant 
were identical with the figures shown on the net profit 
page of Exhibit 1-P for each of the years of the partner-
ship. The defendant made attacks on 1-P and attempted 
to show that the figures had been changed from time 
to time and the book itself was of recent creation. If 
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that were true, it would be expected that the income 
tax figures used by the partners would have been thrown 
off by the change of records, which was not the case 
in any instance. That, we submit, was adoption of the 
records by the defendant. 
Pursuant to the order of the Court, a statement 
was filed by the defendant showing his reported income 
on income tax returns for each year of the partnership. 
This appears at R. 98. A comparison of these figures 
with the net profit page of 1-P shows that the defendant 
for each year reported for income tax purposes the 
identical figures shown on 1-P. His returns for some 
of these years were prepared by his attorney, Mr. Rei-
mann (Ab. 114, R. 1005); for some years by the ac-
countant Mr. Evans (who knew all of the figures con-
nected with the partnership) (A b. 136, R. 1130) ; for 
some years by Mr. Shirley, who had revised the partner-
ship information return for 1955 and then proceeded 
to prepare Mr. Sims' own income tax returns for 1955 
and 1956 (R. 438-429, Ab. 39); he then had assistance 
for the years 1957 and 1958 from the very inquiring 
and well informed Mr. Steiner (Ab. 47, 136, R. 477, 
1131). And the defendant has the temerity to suggest 
that neither he nor any of these well informed persons 
ever had occasion to inquire about and inform him 
whether profit and income from the partnership was 
being correctly computed and reported to him, although 
his share of the income was a substantial item-in 1954 
more than $9,000.00 and in 1956 more than $10,000.00, 
and in 1958 mroe than $19,000.00 (R. 98). 
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In addition to notice indicated by the foregoing 
documents there were a number of significant conver-
sations, which inevitably gave the defendant informa-
tion about the salaries that were accruing on the records. 
There were the conversations between him and Mrs. 
Chambers in 1949 and 1951 involving Exhibits 2-P 
and 21-D, which cannot be ignored in view of Mrs. 
Chambers' Ineticulous habit of making notes on docu-
ments to keep matters straight in her mind. Mr. Sims 
talked to Mr. Beckstrom on the telephone in 1951 con-
cerning salary matters of the partnership (Ab. 121, 
R. 1039, and Ab. 136, R. 1132). He also talked to 
Mr. Reimann on the telephone concerning his previous 
conversation with Mrs. Chambers in October 1952 (A b. 
195, R. 1548). He could not but have been alerted by 
this to the method of accruing salaries into the capital 
account of Chambers. And defendant testified that 
Reimann was his agent in such matters (Ab. 117, R. 
1023, Ab. 133, R. 1115). When the defendant left the 
partnership for the purpose of going to Kearns, he 
discussed the changes w"ith Mrs. Chambers which would 
certainly result in a different handling of salaries ( Ab. 
169, R. 1383-1384). There is no testimony that upon 
his return from the Kearns project he ever looked into 
the records of the practices concerning salaries to deter-
mine what had been done and to arrange for a change 
closer to his desires as to the future. This is because 
he already knew how the books were being kept. 
David Beal had a pointed conversation with the 
defendant previously recited under Point II A as did 
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Robert Shirley, the other certified public accountant, 
who was aware of the capital account study of Mr. 
Beal, had made the depreciation schedule for the part-
nership for 1955, and prepared the defendant's personal 
income tax returns for 1955 and 1956 (Ab. 36, 38, 39, 
R. 416, 426, 428). 
There was a further conversation between Mrs. 
Chambers and Mr. Reimann before February 13, 1957, 
about overdrafts, (Ab. 195, R. 1550) which would have 
been notice to anyone who was not already well in-
formed, as plaintiff insists the defendant was, that the 
partnership accounts showed a situation unfavorable to 
the defendant. 
At the Church Dinner in 1957, Mrs. Chambers 
very properly brought to the defendant's attention the 
unbalanced capital accounts and suggested taking in a 
piece of property from Mr. Hansen, which could go 
to the plaintiff and Mrs. Chambers to reduce their 
capital balance. Mr. Sims said such was not necessary; 
it could be taken by South East; all of which indicated 
an understanding of the capital account situation and 
no surprise (A b. 58, R. 542) . 
From this welter of evidence, the defendant was 
reasonably and fairly notified as to the method of 
keeping salary accounts and capital accounts of the 
partnership. He lived next door and was in the vicinity 
almost every day. He had no excuse for not examining 
the records and knowing what was contained in them 
and used the information from the partnership records 
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in connection with his business at the sand and gravel 
pit an,d his income tax returns. He must be charged 
with know ledge of all that was on the records and be 
held to have acquiesced in and approved the salaries 
credited to the plaintiff on the books of the partnership. 
CJ S on Partnerships, Section 173 (c) makes this 
statement: 
"Since each partner is presumed to know what 
appears on the partnership books, as discussed 
infra Section 227, where an entry is· made in 
such books of a transaction which was beyond 
the scope of the partnership business, after the 
lapse of a reasonable time each partner will be 
presumed to have knowledge thereof in support 
of a ratification." 
And in Section 227: 
''It is presumed that each partner knows the 
entries in the firm books, provided he has access 
to them. The possession of access to the firm 
books by a partner has been held to be presumed, 
but the presumption is rebuttable by evidence 
of non-access.n (Emphasis supplied). 
Significant also are Sections 48-1-16, 48-1-17, and 
48-1-2 UCA 1953. Section 16 provides that the books 
shall be kept at the place of business and that "every 
partner shall at all times have access to and may inspect 
and copy any of them.'' Section 17 requires the render-
ing of any information affecting the partnership which 
a partner may request and Section 2 charges partners 
with knowledge of a fact "not only when he has actual 
knowledge thereof, but also when he has knowledge 
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of such other facts that to act in disregard of them 
shows bad faith." And notice is provided in the said 
Section 2 where there is delivered through the mail or 
by others means of communication a written statement 
of a fact to a person at his place of business or residence. 
Under the statutes cited, the books of the partner-
ship are simply the books of the partnership and each 
partner is charged with knowledge of the contents if 
the partner has access to the books. 
Under the decided cases, in interpreting the uni-
form partnership la-w, partnership books are held to 
be sufficient if an accountant can determine the financial 
condition of the business and the total amount for 
which the bookkeeper is accountable. (Duncan v. Bartie, 
188 Ore. 451, 216 P. 2d 1005; Dale v. Dale, 57 N.M. 
593, 261 P. 2d 438). 
There is some latitude in determining the suffi-
ciency of the accounting, some of the factors being the 
nature of the business, the intelligence of the partners 
or the persons who keep the records, and the circum-
stances under which the work is done. (Dale v. Dale, 
(supra); Bracht v. Connell, 313 Pa. 397, 170 A. 297). 
And far from being inferior evidence, the partner-
ship books are presumed to contain the true history 
of the partnership, so that in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary reliance may properly be placed on 
them to determine the partnership agreement and the 
partnership account, and where access to the books 
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has been available to both parties, they are extremely 
valuable evidence of the true partnership agreement. 
(Darlington v. Perry, 354 Ill. 22, 187 N.E. 796). 
And the ordinary records of the partnership are 
prima facie evidence of the facts contained in them 
and casts the burden of challenging upon the other 
person. (Bracht v. Connell (supra). 
And we submit that the use of partnership infor-
mation as to income or profit in the filing of individual 
income tax returns charges the defendant with knowl-
edge of how the profit or income was computed. 
For instance, in the case of Bernard Stoumen v. 
Commissioner, 12 Tax Court Memorandum Decisions 
267, the tax court considered the situation of a tax-
payer who claimed he did not know that the partner-
ship had additional income, blaming the fraudulent 
withholding of income on a partner who killed himself 
at the commencement of the investigation. The tax 
court went on to say at page 273: 
"A taxpayer is under a legal duty to exercise 
reasonable care in assembling data for the filing 
of an accurate return and may not ignore infor-
mation accessible to him. Petitioner discharged 
that duty by reporting all of the profits shown 
to be distributable to him in an audit report of 
the books of the partnership in the absence of 
any knowledge of other partnership income."· 
In the same case before the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals (208 F. 2d 903) that court held that the 
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taxpayer had discharged his obligation to verify income 
figures by the following comment: 
"For the taxable year in question, Abraham 
had an accountant audit the firm's records and 
determine its income. Using the information 
obtained from that accountant, another account-
ant made up the :firm's and petitioner's income 
tax returns. Petitioner's ~eturns showed his full 
share of partnership income as reflected by the 
firm's books." 
A similar view is indicated in Estate of Louis L. 
Briden v. Commission of Internal Revenue, 11 Tax 
Court of United States Reports, 1095 at 1135, where 
the court said: 
"The record fails to show whether or not the 
decedent took part in the preparation of his 
returns or the partnership returns. Most of them 
were in the handwriting of Gladys Coleman. 
She signed the affidavit of preparation for de-
cedent's 1940 and 1941 returns. His signature 
appears on his personal returns. However, he 
cannot escape his responsibility for a correct 
return by committing its preparation to others." 
POINT III 
WAS REASONABLENESS A PROPER 
ISSUE? 
As above noted, both parties thought they could 
prove specific schedules of salaries as being the agree-
ment of the partnership. Plaintiff by showing the 
entries in the books and records upon which all parties 
38 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had relied and the defendant by showing an oral agree-
ment concerning salaries which was never put into 
operation. Having found against the defendant and 
having gone only part way with the plaintiff, the Court 
concluded that in order to finish the case it was necessary 
to determine what compensation should be awarded 
to the plaintiff under all the circumstances of the case. 
Defendant vigorously resisted further trial on this 
issue, claiming that it was beyond the jurisdiction of 
the District Court. (See Ab. 226 and R. 151-158, also 
A b. 226-234 and 236, R. 17 40-1782) . 
The plaintiff under Point II of this argument has 
attempted to show that it was error for the Court to 
consider further evidence on the issue of reasonable-
ness and should have held that the defendant was bound 
by the records of the partnership. 
Both parties are in agreement that consideration 
of the issue of reasonableness was a last resort in the 
District Court, and both parties are apparently in 
agreement that it is not before this Court unless this 
Court first decides as to the plaintiff that the amounts 
of salaries in the books and records were not binding 
on the defendant, and as to the defendant that he has 
failed on his counterclaim by which he sought to estab-
lish agreement of specific salaries. 
Plaintiff submits that if the District Court was 
right on those two rna tters then the District Court was 
within its powers and was promoting justice and bring-
ing this trial and this partnership dissolution to a logical 
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conclusion by ordering a further trial on the issue of 
reasonableness of salaries to plaintiff. 
It should be borne in mind that the Court did not 
want a further trial. The Court invited the parties to 
cover this issue by stipulation, lest it consider the ap-
pointment of an accountant as a master in chancery (R. 
150). The defendant challenged the authority of the 
Court to appoint a master in chancery without his 
approval (Ab. 226, R. 1747), and the plaintiff encou-
raged the Court to believe that the taking of evidence 
on this issue would not be lengthy (R. 1749). (De-
fendant's refusal to stipulate the reasonable compen-
sation and his objections to appointment of a master 
are contained in a pleading at R. 151 to 158. It is set 
out further at R. 17 41 to 17 44.- The plaintiff's sugges-
tion is found at R. 1748 to 1749). 
A. It was within the pleadings and Pre-Trial 
Order. 
Paragraph 5 of the Complaint refers to the plain-
tiff's "earnings for services performed" and in para-
graph 6 alleges "that practice of the partners has been 
to recognize claims for salaries for services performed 
for the partnership by plaintiff and his wife, Margaret 
S. Chambers, and to the defendant when services were 
rendered by the defendant by making payment or by 
giving credit therefor, and thereafter to divide net 
profits equally between plaintiff and defendant" (R. 
I and 2) . These allegations relate the claims to services 
performed and, therefore, it is submitted, were subject 
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to attack on the basis of reasonableness or the lack 
thereof. 
These allegations were denied in the answer (R. 
20). 
The 12 page answer and counterclaim and cross-
claim contains nun1erous allegations which suggest 
issues of reasonableness. For instance in paragarph 3 
of the First Count of the Counterclaim and Cross-
Claim, it is alleged that plaintiff prior to partnership, 
"was an employee of defendant in said sand and gravel 
business working as a laborer" (R. 22). And in para-
graph 6 that the initial salary schedules were "based on 
the situation of the parties as it then existed, including 
the services then being performed to the partnership 
'tnd the responsibilities of the respective partners and 
the amounts invested by L. H. Sims" (R. 23). In 
paragraph 12 that when R. W. Sims left active parti-
cipation in the business, "He would allow plaintiff the 
sum of $250.00 per month for the time necessarily 
spent to supervise the gravel pit and to perform some 
of the activities which defendant would perform if de-
fendant Royal W. Sims were not away" (R. 24). In 
paragraph 17, the reference to the Agreement of Dis-
solution indicates that "items in dispute relate to sal-
aries, actual contributions to capital, questions of un-
authorized salaries, failure to accredit salaries, with-
drawals made by partners, and other matters" (R. 28). 
And the prayer for relief asks "for such other and 
further relief as shall be equitable and appropriate in 
the premises" (R. 29). 
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The pre-trial order includes this paragraph: 
"4. This issue will involve a contest of every 
salary or partnership distribution e?try in the 
book and also an issue on the entries that the 
defendant Sims claims should have been made 
that were not made." (R. 86). 
Paragraph 7 provided: 
"Parties have stipulated and reached an agree-
ment that they can start from the balance sheet 
figure and make adjustment on the issues in-
volved in this case, on that balance sheet figure. 
(which was then set out)." 
B. Defendant suggested at the opening of the trial 
that it be eliminated. 
In the plaintiff's opening statement, it was said 
that the plaintiff's 
"salary has been entered in the book regu-
larly, increasing as that is the amount his salary 
has increased from year to year, and from time 
to time we say commensurate with the increase 
in wages generally and the general inflation we 
have experienced and also in accordance with 
the growth of the business which has been sub-
stantial." (R. 262). 
And again at page 265 the opening statement referred 
to increases in salaries commensurate with changed 
circumstances. 
After discussion of how the plaintiff proposed to 
prove agreement by practice of the parties or modifi-
cation of agreement, Mr. Burton said: 
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"In view of this, the question of the amount 
of the services in this action should be entirely 
immaterial because he is going to rely solely on 
the practice." ( R. 283) . 
and again: 
"Merely this, that the amount of services, what 
these partners did, aren't going to be of any 
materiality or relevancy on the matter of a 
waiver. On the matter of any agreement, that 
shouldn't come into it. We ought to eliminate 
that entirely, that part of this, of any evidence 
in this case." 
Plaintiff's counsel responded: 
"I would like to agree * * * ." (R. 287). 
And Mr. Reimann then remarked: 
"The question of reasonableness is out of the 
question because the statute fixes that." (R. 288). 
At R. 289 Mr. Bird indicated that he thought 
reasonableness was one of the issues; and if not, he 
would like to avoid it. From these statements, the Court 
concluded: 
''That the contention with respect to salaries 
is that the salary has been specifically determined 
by the practice and that you 'vill endeavor to 
show by your evidence that there was a practice 
and that practice established a specific salary 
and that the matter of reasonableness is not an 
issue in the case." ( R. 292) . 
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C. The possibility that both might fail in their 
claims of specific compensation was recognized. 
Both parties expected to succeed in establishing 
their claimed specific salaries. 
The plaintiff argued: 
"Now it is our position that if we are going 
to eliminate the modifications as the practice of 
the parties has established it, we should return 
not to some fanciful agreement but to the actual 
partnership agreement. Now we are in effect 
before the Court, each of us, asking the Court 
to apply a modification of the original agreement. 
The plaintiff is asking that the Court apply as 
the agreement of the parties, the practice of 
the partnership in their conversations and in 
their record keeping. The defendant is asking 
the Court to apply an entirely different theory, 
and we are both in effect asking to Court to set 
aside the original agreement. 
"Now our position is that if the Court finds 
against the plaintiff, it is going to have a hard 
time lodging upon the position of the defendant, 
and may be compelled to apply the partnership 
agreement as it was originally written, there 
being no meeting of the minds hence, but our 
position is not that." (R. 265). 
In view of all of the foregoing, it was reasonable 
to shorten the trial by eliminating the issue of reason-
ableness, and each side is still contending before this 
Court that it was successful and that reasonableness 
is still not an issue. 
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D. The Court had the right to hear the further 
iss,ne and complete the case. 
The action is primarily for a partnership accowlt-
ing and requires an answer from the Court. Either the 
accounting based upon the books .is tenable or it is 
not tenable; and to say that it is not tenable does not 
give an enforceable answer to the problem. For this 
Court to hold that reasonableness could not be deter-
mined would force the District Court to choose between 
two alternative positions, both of which had, in the 
opinion of the Court, failed. 
The Rules of Civil Procedure encourage the Dis-
trict Court to do what was done in this case in an effort 
to shorten the trial, but with the necessary power to 
obtain justice in the final result: 
Rule 54 (c) ( 1 ) provides : 
"Generally. Except as to a party against 
whom a judgment is entered by default, every 
final judgment shall grant the relief to which 
the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief 
in his pleadings. It may be given for or against 
one or more of several claimants; and it may, 
when the justice of the case requires it, determine 
the ultimate rights of the parties on each side 
as between or among themselves." 
Rule 59 (d) provides that there may be a new trial 
on initiative of the Court within the limits of Rule 
59 (a) which provides for a trial on a limited issue, 
provided the new trial is ordered before 10 days after 
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the entry of judgment. The Court's order in this case 
was well within that time and was conformable to that 
rule. 
Rule 4 (b) provides: 
"The Court in furtherance of convenience or 
to avoid _prejudice may order a separate trial 
of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-
party claim, or of any separate issue or of any 
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, 
third-party claims or issues." 
And in Section 78-7-5 under Powers of Court, sub-
sections 8 and 9 provide: 
"Courts have power to amend and control its 
process and orders so as to make them comform-
able to law and justice. 
"9. To devise and make new process and forms 
of proceedings, consistent with law, necessary 
to carry into effect the powers and jurisdictions 
possessed by it." 
We believe there is ample authority in the Court 
to conduct the trial and defer the trial in the manner 
it was done. The Court did all it could to conserve its 
own time and the time of the parties. 
E. If reasonableness was a proper issue~ the 
Courrs decision was supported by evidence and 
is sound. 
Plaintiff proved a poor prognosticator in suggest-
ing that the issue of reasonableness could be tried 
briefly. That portion of the trial fills two fat volumes 
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of transcript. The various Issues and aspects were 
thoroughly explored and were fairly summarized in 
the Court's supplemental memorandum decision (R. 
181-183). This Court has held that it will affirm an 
issue of fact if it is supported by any credible evidence. 
Defendant in his brief makes no attack on the 
}1-,indings of Fact relative to reasonableness of the 
salary a warded to the plaintiff. His attack is directed 
to the error of the Court in dismissing the counterclaiin 
and the right of the Court to hold a further trial and 
make a determination of reasonableness of compensa-
tion. In the absence of such attack and an effort to 
show that there was no evidence to support the determi-
nation of the Court, a review of the evidence is super-
fluous. There is an abundance of evidence to support 
each of the items mentioned by the Court in its sup-
plemental memorandum decision. This Court has held 
that findings or verdicts on issues of fact will be upheld 
if there is substantial evidence to support them. Lowe 
v. Rosenlof, (supra); Valcarce v. Bitters, (supra). In 
Jewell vs. Horner (supra) the rule is in an equity 
case where clear and convincing proof is required, that 
findings will be upheld unless it manifestly appears that 
the evidence has been misapplied or that the finding is 
clearly against the evidence. In Cassity v. Costagno, 
10 U. 2d, 347 P. 2d 834, the rule is that findings will 
not be disturbed where "It does not appear that the 
evidence is such as to compel" a different finding. In 
Parrish v. Richards, 8 U.2d, 419, 336 P. 2d 122, the rule 
cited from another case is that the findings will be 
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upheld "unless it is manifest that the trial court has 
misapplied proven facts or made findings clearly against 
the weight of the evidence." 
Defendant apparently recognizes, as the plaintiff 
does, that there was arnple evidence to support the 
Court's determination of what compensation should 
be allowed to Chambers before division of the profits, 
and that the conflict in the evidence was such as to give 
the trial judge wide latitude in what evidence it would 
accept and what weight should be given to various por-
tions of the testimony. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT IS BARRED ON HIS COUN-
TERCLAIM BY THE STATUTES OF LIMI-
TATIONS. 
A. Claim for salaries is barred by Section 78-12-25, 
UCA. 1953. 
B. Action for salary based on fraud~ concealment 
or deceit is ban·ed by Section 78-12-26 (3) 
UCA. 1953. 
These defenses were preserved at the trial (R. 
1582), and in the statement of points on cross-appeal 
(R. 227). 
Since the counterclaim was dismissed on plaintiff's 
motion, it would appear to serve no purpose to argue 
these points. If the Court should reverse the trial 
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Court and reinstate the counterclaim, plaintiff would 
not like to be accused of abandoning these defenses. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Each of the parties went to trial initially in the firm 
belief that specific salaries had been established which 
should be paid to the partners before equal division of 
the profits. The plaintiff relied upon long standing 
practice of the parties evidenced by the keeping of 
records that certain amounts were credited to the plain-
tiff for compensation for his services and the remainder 
was divided equally with the defendant. This practice 
had been uniform from 1954 to the time of dissolution 
although admittedly, prior to that time, the basis of 
the computation was not consistent. But whether con-
sistent or not, it was established by the records and has 
never been changed and has, therefore, been accepted 
by the parties. 
The defendant, on the other hand, relied on a claim 
which has never received one speck of support in the 
records or the practices of the parties from May 8, 
1948, until the time of dissolution. The defendant's 
claim that there was an oral agreement made between 
the partners in the limited partnership was not borne 
out by any bookkeeping entries or by any conversation, 
document or claim in which the plaintiff or the cross-
defendant or the bookkeeper Russell Evans ever ac-
quiesced or supported. Defendant claimed that the 
purpose of the agreement was to provide a basis for 
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division of profits for the limited partner who could 
not render any services (Ab. 121, 135, 164, R. 1040, 
1130, 1360) . The limited partner, L. I-I. Sims, died in 
October, 1948, which was before the end of the first 
year of the partnership so that there was never any 
necessity for determining compensation to general 
partners as far as the limited partner was concerned. 
If this was the reason for the agreement, then the reason 
terminated with the death of L. H. Sims. In any event, 
the claimed agreement was sharply disputed by the 
plaintiff and cross-defendant, and the books and rec-
ords of the partnership contain no support whatever for 
the claim of defendant. The Counterclaim was properly 
dismissed. 
The Court found that a number of practices were 
established by the books and records, acquiesced in and 
adopted by the partners and that these included credit-
ing of the cross-defendant's salary to the capital account 
of the plaintiff, recognition that the interest of L. H. 
Sims had been partially absorbed by the plaintiff with 
the consent of cross-defendant and by the defendant 
as to his own one-ninth and that Lois Fors had been 
treated as a continuing limited partner with a one-ninth 
interest; that no salaries or compensation were payable 
to the defendant after the year 1948 until he demanded 
$2500.00 in 1959; and that the plaintiff, because he 
was devoting full-time and long hours to the business, 
was entitled to a salary before division of profits. In 
other words, all of these matters were communicated 
to the defendant by reason of the entries in the books 
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and records, by reason of conversation, and by reason 
of documents, knowledge of the contents of which are 
chargeable to the defendant. 
Plaintiff submits that all of the things which gave 
actual or constructive notice to the defendant of all 
of these practices likewise gave actual and constructive 
notice to the defendant of the amounts of salaries being 
credited to the plaintiff from year to year. It seems 
that the trial court considered the amount of salaries 
larger than the Court was wont to allow the plaintiff 
before division of profits and that "reasonableness" 
entered into the mind of the Court during the first trial, 
even though it had been excluded by stipulation of the 
parties. In this the Court erred. Plaintiff's brief has 
recounted the many docu~ents and conversations which 
brought to the attention of the defendant the facts 
contained in the books and records concerning salaries 
and capital accounts. The brief has recounted also 
preparation of defendant's tax returns by four different 
and well informed accountants or lawyers, each of whom 
had access to the records and each of whom knew or 
should have known the precise basis upon which salaries 
were being paid and profits were being distributed. It 
is unreasonable to assume that no one of these persons 
would have gotten through to the defendant the facts 
shown so plainly on the books and records. 
And the existing books and records without more 
were chargeable to the defendant as a matter of law. 
He lived next door to the office, he conversed with the 
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plaintiff almost daily, he was in the office many times 
during the ten or eleYen years of the partnership, was 
friendly with all of the persons who had access to the 
records or were working on them and can point to no 
reason why he should not be charged with knowledge 
of the books and records of the partnership and, there-
fore, charged as a matter of law with what the records 
contained. 
But if the Court holds otherwise and agrees with 
the trial Court that because of the confidential relation-
ship existing, defendant should have been tied down 
and forced to listen while entries were read to him or 
forced to listen to a recital of exactly how salaries were 
being computed and why, then it was proper for the 
Court to complete the case, complete the partnership 
accounting and dissolution and receive evidence on the 
issues of how much did each partner contribute to the 
partnership and what compensation s~ould be allowed 
to each, all things considered. On this branch of the 
case, the Court was patient and received all evidence 
offered by both parties. Its determination of the facts 
is unassailable. 
The accusations of defendant against his sister are 
unworthy of the defendant and his counsel. Their ef-
forts to prove withholding of records, concealment of 
records, and misleading of the Court fail completely, 
and the Court found "no scintilla of evidence" to sup-
port their accusatory charges. The constant reiteration 
of these accusations by counsel during the trial and the 
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numerous arguments must not be confused with evi-
dence. And it is to be hoped that the frequent repetition 
of charges in the records filed with this Court will not 
thereby be dignified by credence, but that this Court 
will recognize that there was "not one scintilla of evi-
dence" in support of these irresponsible accusations. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS, BIRD AND HART 
716 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant 
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APPENDIX A 
The Abstract of Record of Trial Proceedings did 
not abstract the pleadings or the exhibits. The abstract 
was not submitted to respondents, and they had no 
opportunity to make any suggestions or objections. 
If it had been, the bias in the abstract, apparent from 
a comparison of the record with the abstract, might 
have been avoided. 
This Appendix A is limited to objections to specific 
statements in the abstract and to omissions therefrom. 
The comments, which are included in parentheses, are 
intended to give context to the material pointed out, 
and it is admitted that the purpose of this Appendix 
is to make up in part for the omission of evidence favor-
able to respondents from the printed abstract. 
1. (Although the Court pointed out (R. 279) that 
the opening statements were not evidence in the case, 
the first 15 pages of the abstract is devoted to the open-
ing statements and the discussions of issues. As a result 
of these matters, the issue of reasonableness of salaries 
claimed was eliminated from the law suit. Eliminating 
the issue was suggested by counsel for appellant (R. 
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265 and 282) . ) Respondents thought reasonableness 
was an issue in the case: 
" * * * The plaintiff is asking that the Court 
apply, as the agreement of the parties, the prac-
tice of the partnership in the conversations and 
in their record keeping. The defendant is asking 
the Court to apply an entirely different theory, 
and we are both in effect asking the Court to set 
aside the original agreement. 
"Now our position is that if the Court finds 
against the plaintiff, it is going to have a hard 
time lodging upon the position of the defendant 
and may be compelled to apply the partnership 
agreement as it ·was originally written, there 
being no 1neeting of the minds since, but our 
position is not that. Our position here is that 
the practice of the parties as reflected on the 
books and distribution has become the modified 
agreement of the parties and is the agreement 
which this Court should enforce in this separa-
tion. I think that presents our views." (R. 266). 
And at R. 289 after the Court had indicated that reason-
ableness of services might be eliminated from the case, 
respondents' counsel said: 
"Yes. I thought that was one of the issues. If 
it isn't, I would like to avoid it. If there is no 
question here that the amount of salary paid to 
Mr. Chambers and to Mrs. Chambers was rea-
sonable for the services they rendered, then I 
would like to have the burden of proving only the 
implied agreement of the parties." 
2. (Ab. 15 tries to make it appear that plaintiff 
set out to prove an express agreement as distinguished 
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from a specific salary as pointed out by the Court.) The 
Court and counsel many times during the trial reiterated 
the position of respondent to be that the practice of 
the parties in the partnership established salaries as 
contained on the books although there was no express, 
formal agreement to that effect. (Ab. 37, 48-49, 70, 
229, and 231; and R. 418, 486, 632-641, 1751-1757, 
and 1763). (It is not easy to determine why appellant 
has italicized words on pages 14 and 15 of the abstract 
unless it is to attempt to confuse this Court.) 
3. Ab. 22 starts the 8th line from the bottom with 
the word "are," which in the record is "were." (This 
slight change makes plain the fact that the books were 
accurate and that errors occurred when those working 
with the books in the regular course of the business 
took items from the books. As abstracted, it could mean 
that errors presently result from the use of figures 
from the books.) 
4. Ab. 24, line 10, contains a statement by Mr. 
Beal that: 
"My own books are kept that way." 
That statement was made in answer to the Court's 
question: 
"The Court: But would I understal}d from 
that practice, Mr. Beal, in an informal way, 
after that credit had accrued to Mr. Sims for 
gravel sold, that there is no serious objection 
as classifying it as a credit in his capital account?" 
5. All of the material from line 8 of page 34 to 
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line 6 inclusive of page 35 should be deleted from the 
abstract. (This discussion dealt with the question of 
what were partnership records, which was reiterated 
many times by counsel for appellant, but which is ma-
terial to no issue in the case, and in any event, the 
portion objected to was not in any part evidence.' 
6. The argument of Mr. Burton on A b. 37 is not 
evidence and is an atten1pt to confuse the Court and 
counsel by his gratuitous reference to "the burden of 
an express contract," which was not plaintiff's position. 
7. The reference "Mr. Bird" in line 10 at Ab. 44 
should either be deleted or accompanied by the further 
explanation of R. 457 that Mr. Shirley did not recall 
the presence of Mr. Bird at those conferences. (This 
is significant because of the statement of Mr. Chambers 
that Mr. Bird was not employed until a much later 
time and after the partnership was in jeopardy. Ab. 
109, R. 952). 
8. The first three lines of Ab. 45 do not make 
plain the fact that Mr. Shirley testified that in a con-
ference with Mr. Reimann he had with him certain 
papers showing disparity in capital accounts, which 
were discussed with l\1r. Reimann, and that these in-
cluded a balance sheet, a profit and loss statement, 
a list of equipment, list of accounts payable and accounts 
receivable, "All of the financial information of that 
type." And also on R. 461, Mr. Shirley had testified 
that he had discussed with Mr .Reimann the uneven 
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capital accounts as shown on the books and in the 
specific amounts that appear there. 
9. The last three lines on Ab. 48 and the first three 
lines on Ab. 49 should be stricken as another effort 
to push on to plaintiff the burden of proving an express 
agreement as to salary rather than an agreement im-
plied from the practice of the parties and the partner-
ship. 
10. Ab. 50, line 5, italicizes "written" and then 
neglects to include the statement from the bottom of 
R. 492 that the only agreement in writing as to salaries 
of the partners is with the Farmers Bank in Woods 
Cross. (This agreement was later produced as Exhibit 
20-P, R. 580 and 856). 
11. Ab. 56, 5 lines from the bottom states: "I don't 
know what Mr. Jorgensen did with the statement." But 
Mrs. Chambers testified that Mr. Sims brought the 
statement (Exhibit 8-P) to their second conference 
with him (R. 531). 
12. Ab. 62 in the middle refers to a conversation 
between Mrs. Chambers and Mr. Sims concerning a 
potential sale of the business and neglects to include 
Mrs. Chambers' testimony that: 
"The difference in percentage in the capital 
account was the main cause of discussion." (R. 
589, lines 26 and 27). 
13. Two mistakes on Ab. 64 are significant. In 
the second answer quoted, the second word is "believe" 
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and not "believed." In both the deposition and the 
record it correctly appears as "believe." In the second 
answer quoted, the eighth word is "have" and not 
"had." In the record it appears as "had," which is in-
correct, as the deposition says "have." (Dep. p. 63). 
(These are significant because it is Mrs. Chambers' 
position that the first time she ever he_ard the figures 
$400.00 and $350.00 as salaries was at the taking of 
Mr. Chambers' deposition, when they were included 
in Mr. Reimann's question to Mr. Chambers but never 
used by Mr. Chambers. The two above errors would 
make it appear that Mrs. Chambers was speaking as 
of the time of the original conversation in 1948 instead 
of at the deposition a few months before trial.) 
14. Ab. 71, lines 7 and 8, state that Exhibit 28-D 
shows salaries for Mr. Chambers and Mr. Sims at 
$4,750.00 each for the year 1949. This statement occurs 
in the question of Mr. Reimann, and is, therefore, not 
evidence; and the question was answered negatively. 
(It is, therefore, consistent with Exhibit 1-P referred 
to in the same paragraph of Ab. 71, which likewise does 
not show such salary for either partner in 1949.) 
15. At Ab. 74, first question and answer refer to 
"instructions" by Mr. Sims, and the next question and 
answer refer to something volunteered with asterisks 
separating them. The portions covered by the asterisks 
are that Mrs. Chambers said: 
"It was just understood for years." 
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and that Mr. Sims did not tell her what her duties were, 
but: 
"I volunteered it because we had no one else 
to do it, and someone had to keep some kind of 
order." (R. 662). 
16. Ab. 75 includes several questions and answers 
as though they were consecutive and as though Mrs. 
Chambers recognized testimony by Mr. Chambers that 
there was an agreement concerning salaries. There 
should be asterisks between lines 8 and 9, which asterisks 
should indicate omission of the following significant 
questions and answers: 
"Q. Now, Mrs. Chambers, there isn't any doubt 
in your mind now, is there, that there was 
such an agreement between your husband 
and Mr. Sims on May the 8th, 1948, is 
there? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. There is doubt? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. You don't question his testimony on depo-
sition, do you 1 -
"A. Yes." (R. 668). 
17. Ab. 77 in the middle of the page says the item 
of $810.00 as charged does not appear in the book. 
This is not accurate. Mrs. Chambers testified that it 
does not appear in the book, "As a charge against Mr. 
Sims" (R. 687), although it appeared that the item 
does appear in the books in the John T. Chambers 
capital account (R. 689). 
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18. At Ab. 78 and 79 several questions and answers 
are quoted. At the top of page 79 there is a paraphrase 
of the most important question and answer as follows: 
"Q. Well, didn't he tell you that you were to 
run the office and take care of things at the 
office? 
"A. He said Tal and I were to run the business, 
that he had other plans, and he did not want 
to be bothered with it." (R. 700). 
19. At Ab. 79 in the middle, the sense in which 
Mrs. Chambers said "We still haven't established it" 
is obscured by the asterisks. The asterisks indicate 
"Now, Mrs. Chambers, I hope you will answer my 
question.'' 
20. Ab. 80 has some asterisks between a question 
asking the witness whether a statement of "no time" 
was false and a question which accuses her of not in-
forming Mr. Beckstrom about an agreement as to 
salary. The omitted portions are lines 1 to 11 of page 
707 as follows: 
"Q. Well, but you didn't tell Mr. Beckstrom 
then, informed Mr. Beckstrom that he was 
doing anything for the partnership, did you 1 
"A. I didn't, I don't think. 
"Q. """Tell, did you tell hllp. anything about Mr. 
Sims doing anything for the partnership 1 
"A. We didn't go into a lot of details about it. 
"Q. Well, you emphasized with Mr. Beckstrom 
how much work lVIr. Chambers was doing, 
didn't you? 
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"A. He observed it. He w~s there in our office, 
in our home for about six weeks." (R. 707). 
21. The paragraph at the top of Ab. 82 is a self-
serving question which was not answered, and the ques-
tion was stricken. (R. 716, lines 10 and 11). The para-
graph should be stricken. 
22. Ab. 82 following the question and answer at 
the bottom omits the following (which indicates that 
Mr. Chambers was kept fully informed as to the book-
keeping practices on salaries) : 
"Q. Mrs. Chambers, prior to the time Mr. Stei-
ner came over to the office of the South East 
Ready J\1ix Concrete Company, you had not 
discussed it with your husband up to that 
time, had you? 
"A. Yes, we discussed it on trips, he was always 
-when we would go to the coast, he didn't 
want to go back. 'What do we have to go 
back for, just work and nothing but work.' 
And I say, 'We have got to work and keep 
on working until we can get something to 
leave with. We can't just go out with our 
suitcases.' We discussed that many times 
because he was so tired of working night 
and day." (R. 719). 
23. Ab. 83 middle of page. The abstract states 
that Mrs. Chambers remembered a conversation with 
Mr. Sims about no salaries until the equipment was 
paid for. On pageR. 721 Mrs. Chambers also testified 
that she recalled no discussion \vith Mr. Sims "that 
unless the company can pay salaries to both partners, 
it can't pay a salary to either one." 
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24. Ab. 83 at the bottom refers to a loan to South 
East of $10,100.00 although that matter upon objection 
by counsel and discussion of the Court was withdrawn 
by Mr. Reimann (R. 725, line 7). 
25. Ab. 84, the question and answer are quoted. 
(If it amounts to a matter of recollection of previous 
testimony, her previous testimony at R. 519 should be 
noted where she testified that salaries and share of the 
profits had been mentioned to Mr. Sims. But at:;tually 
the word used on Exhibit 17-P and which indicates the 
probable conversation, is "wages" and not "salaries".) 
26. Ab. 84 in the middle of the page refers to a 
stipulation that the books don't show overdraft of the 
Sims' account. The record makes plain that only over-
drafts at the end of the year would appear on the books 
because of their annual accounting, and that the over-
drafts complained of appeared on worksheets made by 
Mr. Evans. (See Exhibit 57-P) (R. 729 to 731). 
27. A b. 84 bottom of page. The abstract does not 
Inention from the testilnony of Mrs. Chambers that 
Exhibits 16-P and 17-P were shown to appellant and 
counsel at the taking of deposition (R. 733-734). 
28. Starting at the bottom of Ab. 84 and through 
the first paragraph of 85 is a discussion of whether 
Exhibits 8-P and 9-P are part of the records. At R. 
773 it is shown that 8-P is part of Exhibit 21-D, which 
was produced by appellant from the records of the 
partnership, although no reference is made to that fact 
in Abstract 89 where R. 773 is passed over. 
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29. Ab. 90 at bottom of page. The abstract omits 
R. 786 line 27 to R. 787 line 9, where Mrs. Chambers 
testified that it was her practice to put slips in the books 
or a faint pencil mark and then, "Maybe once a year 
after income tax, or just before income tax, to see if 
the things are like Mr. Evans says they are." 
30. Ab. 91 in the second to the last paragraph 
refers to our interest in showing that Sims' confidence 
in Mrs. Chambers was great, but the abstract omits 
the staternents of Mr. Reimann: "\V e will admit that 
he had unbounded confidence in Mrs. Chambers, * * * " 
but without admitting that she was given authority to 
supplant the partners in the management of the busi-
ness (R. 794, 797-798). 
31. Ab. 92 below the middle of the page refers to 
Exhibit 25-P but does not mention that she made it 
in 1955 and discussed this memo with Mr. Evans on 
the following income tax time and not until August, 
1957, did she make the notation about salaries and "Aug. 
1957" at the bottom of the memo (R. 801). 
32. Ab. 93 toward the end of long paragraph states 
that Evans made an entry and called it salary for Mr. 
Sims, but omits the testimony that the entry was made 
"at Mr. Sims' suggestion" (R. 816). 
33. Ab. 96 at beginning of bottom paragraph. In 
addition to making the statement attributed to Mr. 
Sims, Mrs. Chambers testified· that he said: 
''You and Tal have been running things long 
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enough. I am going to run it from now on, and 
you can either do it my way or get out." (R. 
829.) 
34. .....L\b. 96 and 97 fail to refer to the testimony 
concerning Exhibit 25-P that it was discussed with 
Mr. Evans shortly after it was made and the notation 
was put on "August 1957" at that later time (R. 833-
834). 
35. Ab. 98 in the top paragraph erroneously refers 
to Mr. Sims saying he did not want the partnership to 
have a bookkeeping machine, when it was 1\tlrs. Cham-
bers who said that, and the abstract fails to mention 
the more important controversy over the purchase of 
six mixers indicated by this testimony of Mrs. Cham-
bers: 
"He (Sims) says, 'Why won't Tal go along 
with this thinking? I have been working on it 
for some time,' and I said, 'Because we don't 
need six mixers, we only need one at the time, 
and we don't have the money for it. ''Teare tired 
of doing without.' " (R. 850). 
36. A b. 128 last part of middle paragraph. (The 
abstract correctly recites that counsel for respondent 
stated that Mrs. Chambers had testified that the words 
"'¥ages, M. & T." were put on the memorandum after 
the conversation. This only proves that counsel was 
mistaken in his recollection, since an examination of 
Exhibit 17-P and a comparison with Mrs. Chambers' 
testimony at R. 541 indicate that those words, "Wages, 
M. & T." were put on during the conversation with Mr. 
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Sims, and were not the pencil notations put on later 
to fix the conversation.) 
37. Ab. 14~2. At R. 1183 Mr. Evans testified that 
the conversation in October, 1958, between Mrs. Cham-
bers and Mr. Steiner is the first conversation in October, 
1958, between Mrs. Chambers and Mr. Steiner is the 
first conversation in which she expressed any doubt as 
to the correctness of the practice of putting salaries 
in the Chambers capital account. And following the 
conversation with Mr. Evans, she never again ex-
pressed any doubt as to that practice (R. 1186). 
38. Ab. 143 at middle of the page. Evans does 
not deny that prior to 1955 he kept track of the salaries 
of John T. Chambers and Margaret Chambers and 
entered them in a capital account, and there was a page 
for that capital account prior to the one now in the 
book Exhibit 1-P (R. 1193). 
39. Ab. 143 bottom of page. Evans further testi-
fied that there is no false information contained in the 
present John T. Chambers capital account in Exhibit 
1-P (R. 1193, line 26). 
40. A b. 144 and 145. (The abstract glosses over 
the cross-examination of Russell Evans and makes it 
appear to be a meaningless controversy between counsel 
as to the effect that Evans' testimony on cross-exami-
nation and in his earlier deposition had on his testimony 
on direct examination. In his opening statement Mr. 
Reimann had emphasized the claim that Exhibit 1-P 
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had not been prepared as to its capital accounts until 
1955 ( R. 273, A b. 8) . Mr. Evans had so testified on 
his direct examination and had testified that the net 
profit page was not made untill957 (Ab. 141, R. 1178). 
The extended cross-examination and effort to impeach 
this testimony by comparison of Mr. Evans' earlier 
deposition thus had an importance and an effect which 
the abstract completely ignored.) 
Evans was asked why he had not said at the taking 
of his deposition that the .John T. Chambers' capital 
account was a new page in 195.5, and the witness asked 
whether the question had been asked him (R. 1194). 
Evans also said that the only records kept of net profit 
was on income tax returns, and he was asked why he 
had not made that statement, thinking of his deposition, 
and he said he would have if he had been asked ( R. 
1196, line 13) . Evans first testified that the net profit 
page was made up from information on the tax returns 
and that there was no earlier page on net profits before 
the present one was written (R. 1197). Evans then 
admitted that Mr. Beal could have examined the net 
profit page in a ledger in 1955, and that it could have 
been written before 1955, and that it is all in his hand-
writing ( R. 1199) . Exhibit 40-P was then introduced 
in evidence. Mr. Evans testified that the tax return was 
his work and that he determined the partners' capital 
accounts total at $80,186.80. (The significance of this 
is that the figure of $80,000.00 does not agree with the 
total capital of the partners as shown on the capital 
accounts 701 and 703 and Exhibit 1-P, thus tending 
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to belie the formei· testiinony that these accounts were 
prepared from the tax returns at a later date (R. 1201). 
Questions and answers from Evans' earlier depo-
sition were then read to hun wherein he testified that 
he had never heard of the conversation between n.-Ir. 
Sims and Mrs. Chambers in which Siins asked why 
salary had been entered on the books for Cha1nbers 
and nothing for hiin, as contrasted with his direct exam-
ination when he recalled the conversation plainly. The 
witness then said that what he meant on the deposition 
was that he was not present at the conversation (R. 
1207). 
Questions and answers from the deposition were 
then read which implied that Evans was keeping a 
record· of net profit divisions currently from 1952 on 
without making any suggestion that the pages had been 
rewritten in 1955 (R. 1209). The witness was then 
read further questions and answers in the deposition 
in which he had testified that the current accounts were 
adequate although there was a question as to whether 
the salaries would be altered, contrasting with his testi-
mony on direct examination (R. 1215). Following 
objections of counsel for defendant, the Court noted 
that the iinpression created by the witness on his direct 
examination as to these matters had been gradually 
modified and that his testimony had now become con-
trary to that testiinony on direct (R. 1215). Upon 
reading further from the deposition, it appeared that 
the witness had never discussed inadequacy of the rec-
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ords with Mr. Shirley or with Mr. Beal or done anything 
else about it although the matter of posting from the 
net profit account to the capital accounts was a matter 
of simple arithmetic (R. 1217). The Court also com-
mented on this as being a change from his testimony 
on direct (R. 1217 to 1.218). 
As to the ti1ne when the net profit account was 
created, further questions and answers from the depo-
sition were read indicating that the net profit account 
had been in existence during the time of posting to the 
capital account and not created later (R. 1221). 
41. Ab. 154, lines 4 to 7 state that the Court said 
evidence there was no regular system of withdrawals 
is "knocking down their case." (R. 1293 shows no such 
implication in the Court's comments, but only that the 
offering of a book showing incomplete records was 
part of their counterclaim, if material at all, because 
plaintiff claimed nothing for the book offered.) 
42. Ab. 157 bottom of page. The abstract fails to 
mention that Exhibit 47-P was in lVIr. Steiner's hand-
writing and was prepared from Exhibit 1-P in carrying 
out Mr. Sims' instructions to determine what the capital 
accounts showed (R. 1323-1324). And the Exhibit 
goes beyond the question of overdraft to show a tenta-
tive division of the total assets of the business (R. 1325). 
43. After the first paragraph on Ab. 161, there 
should be added: 
"Q. Where do you find in 2-P a reference to 
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$400.00 for Mr. Sims and $350.00 for 1\tlr. 
Chambers? 
"A. I said it was a clue. 
"Q. I see. You figured that because of this 
$357.00 for Mr. lVIortensen you might make 
stick the argument that 1\Ir. Sims was to 
be a little higher and Mr. Chambers a little 
lower? 
"A. That had been my understanding with Mr. 
Sims. 
"Q. But you have found no entry and I know 
you have searched the records for this, which 
supports $400.00 a month for Mr. Sims and 
$350.00 for Mr. Chambers, have you 1 
"A. No, I haven't." (R. 1347, lines 14-25). 
44. Ab. 164 bottom paragraph, as to a theoretical 
memorandum showing salaries as claimed by Mr. Sims, 
Mr. Sims testified that he did not know that there was 
such a memorandum and had never asked to see such 
(R. 1362). 
45. Ab. 165, bottom line. In addition to stating 
that he did not accept the difference in their capital 
accounts, Mr. Sims testified: 
"'Ve talked about it in terms of them having 
90 per cent of the business because according to 
her statement there, he had more capital in the 
business than I did at that time." (R. 1365-1366). 
46. Ab. 167 bottom paragraph. After stating that 
some drilling and blasting will have to be done, Mr. 
Sims testified that he was not suggesting that the part-
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nership should remove the concrete on his land but only 
that the land contributed to the partnership (R. 1373). 
47. Ab. 173 at end of first full paragraph Mr. 
Evans testified that he did not recall whether Mrs. 
Chambers requested the preparation of Exhibit 57-P 
(R. 1413), and after refreshing his recollection from 
his former deposition, he recalled that he prepared the 
chart without any request from anyone and for his own 
information and the information of Mrs. Chambers (R. 
1414). 
48. Ab. 175, line 9. In addition to saying that in-
formation was available to Mr. Sims, Mr. Evans testi-
fied that he made a written statement of net profit for 
some years and definitely for 1954, and is not certain 
whether every year was in writing, (R. 1436) and the 
copies were forwarded to the place where Mr. Sims 
was (R. 1437). Mr. Sims never requested any infor-
mation from him concerning the net profit figure he 
had computed (R. 1437-1438). 
49. Ab. 175, line 18. The handwriting to the left 
on Exhibit 19 is either that of Mr. Shirley or Mr. Sims 
(R. 1438). 
50. Ab. 181, line 11. Mr. Evans also testified that 
Exhibit 15-P was prepared "To show what percent 
Tal had in the business" (R. 1481). 
51. Ab. 181, line 18. With reference to Exhibit 
7-P, which is a state_ment of profit for 1954, Mr. Evans 
testified that he doesn't know whether a copy of the 
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document "was sent up or whether it was deliv-ered in 
person" but "I suppose that I would have delivered 
it." (R. 1483, lines 8-14). 
52. Ab. 193, line 2. Concerning the meeting at 
Mr. Reimann's home in May, 1948, Mrs. Chambers 
testified that she and her father were not separated 
during the entire evening and that she was beside him 
the whole evening (R. 1536). 
53. Ab. 193, line 13. Mrs. Chambers testified that 
following a conversation about Exhibit 21-D with Mr. 
Sims and, she thinks, her husband, she made some nota-
tion on Exhibit 21-D (R. 1538-1539). 
54. Ab. 195, line 4. Mrs. Chambers testified to 
conversations about overdrafts by defendant with Mr. 
Reimann two or three times on the telephone and once 
when she and her husband were at his place having 
some legal papers signed, the earliest in 1952 and again 
in 1954 after the travel hatcher was producing (R. 
1547). 
55. Ab. 200, after the first full paragraph, in addi-
tion to the matters abstracted, counsel asked Mrs. 
Chambers when, during the depositions, the phrase, 
"None of your business" was first used (R. 1589). And 
she then read from the deposition of Russell Evans that 
Mr. Reimann objected to a question"as wholly incom-
petent, irrelevant, and immaterial" and then: 
"Mr. Bird: That objection is reserved by stat-
ute, Mr. Reimann, and you know it." 
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''Mr. Reimann: It is none of your business if 
he had 100 employees, it makes no difference." 
(This is probably immaterial, as is the long colloquy 
quoted at Ab. 187 to 191). 
56. Ab. 200 in middle of page. Mrs. Chambers 
testified that purchasing rna terial from another source 
was not at Mr. Sims' expense because the partnership 
did the biggest part of the hauling (R. 1592). 
57. Ab. 231 after line 7. The Court was also re-
ferred to Rule 54 (c) ( 1) and to Morris vs. Russell, 
236 P 2d 451, 26 ALR 2d 947, 120 U. 945, as giving 
the Court authority to inject a new issue so as to give 
a party the relief to which he is entitled (R. 1764). 
58. Ab. 233 after the second paragraph. (The 
important part of the long discussion as to how the 
trial could go forward after the memorandum decision, 
was not the contentions of the parties but the view of 
the Court, which appeared at R. 1770 and is omitted 
from the abstract): 
"The Court: The Court believes in accordance 
with the statute that partners in limited partner-
ship agreement complied with the statutes with 
respect to compensation and that had there been 
a fuller disclosure between l\1rs. Chambers 
and Mr. Sims so that it would have a period 
[appeared?} clearly to have been binding upon 
him, I would have found in accordance with the 
book, but I was not convinced that it was a full 
disclosure, that it was frank, that it was under-
standable between the two, as I think should have 
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been the case where that situation and relation-
ship of trust aud confidence, brother and sister, 
existed, and if I had been so convinced of that, 
I would lmYe found in accordance with vvhat ~1r. 
Bird contended was a practice and which I could 
not see as a practice under the circumstances 
adopted by the parties so that it would enable 
the Court to by iinplication find that they had 
agreed upon it." 
59. Ab. 233, bottom of page. The Court indicated 
its view that beeause of the written partnership agree-
ment providing that the partners may compensate them-
selves, the statute was satisfied, and the practice of the 
parties became admissible to show that Chambers was 
to receive compensation for his full time and that Sims 
was not claiming compensation. Except for a written 
or oral agreement fixing salaries month after month 
and year after year, the partners could have recovered 
only their share of profits (R. 1771-1772 and 1774). 
60. Ab. 235 at the bottom of the page. The abstract 
sets forth at length a motion of defendant for production 
of documents and brushes aside the answer and objec-
tions of the plaintiff, which, in addition to alleging 
that the defendant's motion is frivolous, derogatory, 
cantankerous and scandalous, charges that the motions 
are dilatory, an effort to obscure the issues, resort to 
prejudice and slander, to encumber unduly the record, 
and to delay the decision, and that any issue of contempt 
for failure to produce documents should be based upon 
a charge, an answer, the forming of issues and a hearing, 
but not as part of this case or in a manner to delay 
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decision, obscure the issues and impede justice ( R. 171-
173). 
61. A b. 57, six lines from the bottom erroneously 
refers to the handwriting of Mrs. Sims instead of, ob-
viously, Mr. ~ims (R. 539). r.rhe previous line accu-
rately reflects the record but the record is obviously 
wrong in using the figure "$123,057 and $180,000." 
An examination of Exhibit 17-P will make plain that 
the witness referred to the figures "One hundred twenty 
three thousand, fifty seven, and One hundred eighty 
thousand'' with those words and that the reporter missed 
the comma inflection after "one hundred twenty-three 
thousand.'' 
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APPENDIX B 
Note: A vast number of exhibits were received in 
evidence and quite a large additional number were 
offered and refused. The abstract fails in many cases 
to indicate the character of the exhibits or the purposes 
for which the exhibits were offered. Presumably, the 
defendant handle~. this abstract in the way it thought 
was most desirable. Plaintiff offers herewith, as an 
abstract of plaintiff's exhibits, and as a convenience to 
the Court in assimilating the great mass of oral and 
documentary evidence the following comments as to 
the purpose for which plaintiff's exhibits were offered 
and the nature of the exhibits: 
EXHIBIT 1-P was the ledger of the partnership 
and constituted the basis of the accounting in the action. 
The plaintiff contends that under the proprietor tab 
were accounts of net profit and capital accounts of both 
partners which were sufficiently definite to constitute 
the final basis of settlement between the parties. 
EXHIBIT 2-P was the first ledger used in the 
partnership business and was superseded by 1-P. It 
is in the handwritings of Mr. Sims (the back portions 
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R. 1151) , but mostly 1\'Irs. Chambers, Shirley Smith 
and Mr. Evans. (1\..b. 50, R. 494, 496). 
EXHIBIT 3-P was a summary of the partners' 
capital account prepared by Mr. Beal and showing 
the effect of the contentions of the respective parties 
as to allowance of salaries. 3-P was made the basis of 
the pre-trial order. 
EXHIBIT 4-P is one of the exhibits prepared by 
David N. Beal in 1955 and into 1956 from the records 
of the company. It is a study of the capital accounts 
of the partners built up a year at a time and in accord-
ance with Mr. Beal' s understanding of the partnership 
agreement. The exhibit sheet does not show it, but 
P-4 was admitted into evidence at R. 420. 
EXHIBIT 4-P (b) was apparently not received 
in evidence. 
EXHIBIT 6-P is a series of balance sheets and 
profit and loss statements prepared by Russell A. 
Evans, bookkeeper for the partnership. There was con-
siderable testimony on both sides as to whether these 
various documents were delivered or sent to Mr. Sims 
or whether some information fron1 them was telephoned 
to him or delivered on a slip of paper. 
EXHIBIT 7-P was similar to 6-P but as to the 
1954 statement contained more specific information 
about salaries than the other yearly statements. There 
was considerable testimony as to 7-P and in what form, 
if any, Mr. Sims had access to it. 
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EXHIBIT 8-P is a longhand statement of capital 
accounts made by Mr. Jorgensen, the father-in-law of 
Mr. Sims, and in his handwriting (A b. 33, R. 382) . 
Mr. Sims denied that it was prepared at his instance 
(Ab. 128, R. 1078) ; 1\irs. Chambers said that Mr. Sims 
requested it of Mr. Jorgensen (A b. 56, R. 529) ; and 
Mr. Jorgensen wasn't sure how he came to prepare it 
(Ab. 35, R. 409, 411), except he had testified Mr. Sims 
did not request it ( Ab. 35, R. 383, 390, 406). 
EXHIBIT 9-P is a typewritten copy of 8-P, with 
figures for an additional year added. 
EXHIBIT 12-P is a copy of a letter sent to the 
partners by 1\-Ir. Ray Liljenquist in 1956 with a sched-
ule which is the result of Mr. Shirley's work on the 
books of the company. 
EXHIBITS 13-P and 14-P are, of course, the 
partnership information returns to the United States 
and the State of Utah for the years 1955 and 1956. 
13-P shows the division of salaries and profits for that 
year between Chambers and Sims as does Exhibit 14, 
and each shows 100 per cent of Chambers' time devoted 
to the business and none of Sims'. 
EXHIBIT 15-P is a study of capital accounts of 
John T. Chambers through the year 1955 and showing 
his percentage ownership of the business. This was made 
by Russell Evans. 
EXHIBITS 16-P and 17-P are notes made dur-
rng conversations between Mrs. Chambers and Mr. 
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Sims on March 7, 1956, and discussing the conclusions 
as to ownership of capital as shown on Exhibits 4-P, 
8-P and 15-P. Part of the figures and drawings are 
those of Mrs. Chambers and part are those of Mr. 
Sims, and the pencil notations were put on by Mrs. 
Chambers after the conversation. 
EXHIBIT 18-P is a typical year end statement 
made by Russell Evans for the benefit of the partners 
and showing salary for Chambers and none for Sims. 
EXHIBIT 19-P was a similar statement for 
1955, but showing net profit only with adjustments in 
pencil, which became the basis of the 1955 tax returns 
of the partners. 
EXHIBIT 20-P is a copy of document filed at 
the Farmers State Bank in Woods Cross in 1947 and 
the document about which Mr. and Mrs. Chambers both 
testified as being the only agreement concerning sal-
aries that was made in the early stages of the partner-
ship (R. 899 and 492). 
EXHIBIT 21-D was offered by defendants but 
is a set of work sheets or memoranda made by Mrs. 
Chambers concerning salaries and which was prelimi-
nary to the salary schedules placed in 1-P. It also con-
tains a copy of Exhibit 9-P. 
EXHIBIT 25-P is a memorandum in the hand-
writing of Mrs. Chan1bers which she testified was a 
notation concerning her questioning of the salary of 
Mr. Chambers in 1955 in the amount of $11,700.00, 
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and her notation concerning that salary and which she 
said was discussed with Mr. Evans. The notation of 
August, 1957, is also in her handwriting, which she 
stated was put on two years later. (A b. 92, R. 798, 802). 
EXHIBIT 26-P is two thermofax pages of origi-
nals made in Mr. Evans' handwriting and a yellow 
sheet which is a copy of a memorandum made by RusseH 
Evans concerning a conference in January, 1959, as a 
result of which adjustments in sand and gravel charges 
were made and the salary item of $2500.00 was put on 
the books for Mr. Sims. 
EXHIBIT 27-P is a copy of a letter from Mr. 
Chambers to Mr. Sims typed by Mr. Evans and which 
is self~explanatory. 
EXHIBIT 32-P is not scheduled by the reporter 
in his summary sheets for some reason. It was offered 
and received at R. 1008 for the purpose of identifying 
the time of a conversation with Mr. Reimann which 
related to the $2,000.00 salary for each of the partners 
originally shown on Exhibit 2-P and originally claimed 
on the partnership return and then amended. 
EXHIBIT 39-P is a record kept in 1948 of which 
some of the entries were in the handwriting of Mr. 
Sims (Ab. 182, R. 1497). The purpose and extent of 
the book were not established. 1\!Ir. Sims testified the 
first two pages were not in his handwriting ( R. 1149) ; 
then that June and July pages were his (R. 1149-1150) ; 
then that he was not sure (R. 1155); and then that the 
first three pages were his (R. 1159, 1497). 
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EXHIBIT 40-P is the U. S. Partnership Return 
of Income for 1953 which shows one-third of Mr. Sims' 
time devoted to the business and two-thirds of Mr. 
Chambers', with income reported in those proportions. 
EXHIBIT 46-P is a drawing made by Mr. Steiner 
of the situation of the parties in Mr. Reimann's office 
at the taking of the deposition of Mr. Chambers. 
EXHIBIT 47-P is a study of the capital accounts 
of the partners made from Book 1-P by Glendon Steiner 
in 1958. 
EXHIBITS 53-P, 54-P, 55-P and 56-P are all 
related to deficiency assessments or overpayment of 
income tax by the Federal Government and documents 
which were submitted to the partnership and handled 
by Mr. Evans and which the plaintiff contended were 
brought to the attention of Mr. Sims in the process of 
handling. 
EXHIBIT 57-P is a graph made by Russell 
Evans to show the year to year supplies of sand and 
gravel to the partnership by l\1:r. Sims and his with-
drawal of funds and to demonstrate what were called 
by the bookkeeper overdrafts of his account. 
EXHIBIT 62-P is an order of the district court 
and is self-explanatory. 
EXHIBIT 63-P was the exhibit offered when the 
case was reopened by the plaintiff for the purpose of 
showing the confidence which Mr. Sims had in Mrs. 
Chambers and that he was unable to devote time to the 
partnership affairs. 
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APPENDIX C 
ANSWER TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NOTE: 
Plaintiff's Brief should answer the Appellant's 
Brief. Much of that has been done, although not in 
precise manner. When the brief was put together it 
was too long under the rules. The affirmative argument 
has been retained and the answering portion placed 
here so the Court can disregard it if it wishes, along with 
comparable portions of Appellant's Brief's Appendix. 
To attempt to answer the Brief of Appellant an 
item at a time and cover all items would only get us 
and the Court lost in denial and refutation and would 
accomplish nothing. The record is too long and too 
verbose. 
Typical of this is a 12 page answer to a 3 page 
complaint (R. 1 to 3 and 19 to 30). And for what it 
may be worth, plaintiff has examined the pleading 
file in this case consisting of 245 numbered pages and 
submits that of those pages plaintiff has supplied 47, 
the defendant 135 and the Court 52, and 11 pages relate 
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to supplemental proceedings in the District Court after 
entry of judgment and should not be in this record. 
Defendant's brief continues a typically distorting 
note from the trial by stating under "Disposition of 
Case in District Court" that plaintiff claims an express 
agreement establishing partners' salaries. The com-
plaint alleges in paragraphs 5 and 6 that the practice 
of the partners modified the written agreement, and the 
prayer asks for a determination of whether this practice 
modified the written agreement (R. 1, 2 and 3). This 
was made plain in the opening statement and discussion 
with the Court, (A b. 6, R. 267) where the Court said: 
"Well, I think we could agree as a matter of 
law that a practice established by the partners 
could modify a written agreement." 
At Ab. 15, R. 292, the Court again noted that the 
plaintiff would rely on a salary that had been specific-
ally determined "by the practice, and that you will 
endeavor to show by your evidence that there was a 
practice, and that practice established a specific salary, 
and that the matter of reasonableness is not an issue 
in the case." And yet the defendant delighted in refus-
ing to recognize the issue as thus formed by stating 
repeatedly that the plaintiff had undertaken to prove 
an express contract fixing the salaries contained in the 
books and records of the parties (A b. 37, R. 420; Ab. 
48, 49, R. 486; Ab. 70, R. 631 by the Court; R. 
633 by Mr. Reimann, R. 638 Mr. Reimann, R. 
638 to 639 Mr. Burton, Mr. Bird and the Court; 
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A b. 229 and 230, R. 17 57 and 1760 where the Court 
said: 
"The Court will not listen to any statement of 
that sort. There was no contention made of an 
express contract and the Court understands what 
an express contract is * * * ." 
and again: 
"That says nothing about an express contract. 
We are going to have no more conversation about 
express contract.'' 
At the bottom of page 2 of his brief, defendant 
refers to the memorandum decision as holding there 
was not sufficient disclosure of the entries to become 
binding on Sims, whereas the decision plainly provided 
that the practice was binding on Sims, but that in view· 
of the confidential relationship between Mrs. Chambers 
and Mr. Sims, the amount of the salaries set up on the 
books was not sufficiently disclosed or imparted to the 
defendant to establish the amounts (R. 149 to 150). 
On page 3 of his brief in the middle of the page, 
it is stated that the Court "denied salary to Sims after 
July 1948" although finding number 7 allows the 
$2,500.00 claimed in 1959 ( R. 185 to 186) . 
And finally, defendant states on page 3 that plain-
tiff filed Notice of Appeal from the entire judgment, 
although plaintiff plainly designated his statement of 
points on appeal as follows: 
1. The practices of the parties establishes the capi-
tal accounts in Exhibit 1-P. 
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2. Salaries and withdrawals are those shown in 
the books. 
3. Plaintiff's judgment should be increased by 
$22,000.00 (R. 226). 
Cross-appellant has previously said that the entire 
statement of facts is unacceptable. To controvert each 
misstatement would take too long and profit but little. 
We shall content ourselves with the following: 
a. At page 5 it is said initial capital investments 
were R. W. Sims $16,355.90 and J. T. Chambers 
$6,582.72 (Exhibit 5-D). There was no issue on this 
as the pre-trial order plainly provided; and the plain-
tiff's account although in the file was not made a matter 
of evidence as it was immaterial. Exhibit 4-P, how-
ever, shows the initial capital investment to be: At the 
end of 1947-$6,562.72 for Chambers and $5,860.54 
for Sims; and Exhibit 1-P capital accounts shows that 
at the end of 1947 (partnership started May 8, 1948) 
$6,582.72 for Chambers and $10,641.23 for Sims, and 
the certificate of limited partnership itself recites only 
the investment of the limited partner L. H. Sims, which 
is stated to be $8,500.00. There was no testimony on this 
rna tter at the trial. 
b. On page 5 defendant says under (c) that 
monthly salaries were fixed in the amount of $400.00 
for R. W. Sims and $350.00 for Chambers, although 
this was exactly what the Court did not find in its memo-
randum decision (R. 148 to 150) and its Findings of 
Fact (R. 184 to 189) . 
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c. Page 6 of his brief. Defendant says that follow-
ing the May 8th meeting and on "the next day ~~Irs. 
Chambers prepared a memorandum or work sheet with 
respect to salaries of Mr. Chambers and Mr. Sims" (Ab. 
65 and R. 607 do not state that anything was done the 
next day or for a couple of years, and the flrst Inemo-
randum was probably Exhibit 21-D, which was prob-
ably prepared in 1952 since the first page of longhand 
in Exhibit 21-D runs through December 31, 1951.) 
d. In the middle of page 6 of defendant's brief 
it is stated that Mrs. Chambers destroyed the original 
Inemorandum. The witness did not testify that the 
memorandum was destroyed or that she destroyed it. 
At R. 498 she testified: 
"It was probably destroyed when it was all 
entered into the books. We had no further use for 
it." 
But defendant had Exhibit 21-D unknown to the wit-
ness and had her identify it at R. 609 after testifying 
at R. 608 that she: 
"put them on a large spread sheet and had it 
checked back. I didn't see any further use of 
them. I might still have them in my personal 
files. I generally don't throw anything away." 
e. Middle of page 7 of his brief defendallt states 
that salaries for Sims were omitted "without any dis-
cussion with either partner" ignoring the fact that Sims 
told Mrs. Chambers he would be away from the busi-
ness to take care of his affairs at Kearns. (Exhibit 
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63-P and R. 1037 and 1038, Ab. 120 where Sims said 
he would absent himself for a period of time.) 
f. Middle of page 7 defendant says Mr. Chambers 
did not authorize Mrs. Chambers to change salaries. 
Actually, Mr. Chambers relied on her completely, gave 
her full authority in the office, and was advised by many 
conversations as to the salaries. Chambers left this 
matter to his wife, (R. 877, see also Ab. 135). Here-
ceived such general statements as satisfied him (Ab. 
106, R. 114). He and his wife had many conversations 
about salaries (A b. 95, R. 826) . Salaries were discussed 
a dozen times (R. 917). When Mrs. Chambers was 
upset by her conversations with defendant in the Fall 
of 1958, the plaintiff advised her that the salaries were 
in conformity to the partnership agreement, that every-
body told him that (Ab. 205, R. 1617). 
g. Middle of page 8 the brief states that no one 
told Mr. Sims about the explicit entries or omissions 
until October, 19.38. This is fully considered under Point 
II C of this brief. 
h. On page 9 state1nents are made about errors in 
partnership records. Mr. Beal testified that the errors 
were summary errors (Ab. 202, R. 1605), and Mr. 
Steiner testified that after 1952 no changes were made 
except based upon depreciation (Ab. 157, R. 1321). 
i. The brief at page 9 quotes counsel's statement 
about Mrs. Chambers that "she was confused about" 
whether she was a partner. This is cormnented on because 
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it seems to reflect on Mrs. Chambers. Paragraph 4 
of the complaint alleges that Mrs. Chambers as heir 
of one third of her father's interest: "has treated her 
partnership interest as being added to plaintiff's in-
terest" (R. 1). The Answer denies that Mrs. Chambers 
is a partner, and disclaims know ledge of how she treated 
the assets inherited from her father (R. 19-20). The 
pre-trial order refers to J. T. Chambers and Margaret 
S. Chambers as "plaintiffs" for convenience (R. 86) 
then recited: "The pre-trial Court was not sure of her 
position in the partnership and denied the motion" ( R. 
88). In the opening statement, counsel stated that Mrs. 
Chambers' right had never been formally considered 
"and we are making no point of that, we are not con-
tending that she is a partner * * * . The parties have 
assumed that they on one hand and the defendant on 
the other hand were equally partners. * * *. " And 
again, "There has never been any formal assignment of 
that which is true and exactly the status of the cross-
defendant I don't believe is material, but it may be" (R. 
257). She testified that she was authorized to sign titles 
as a partner (A b. 63, R. 600) . And the Court asked 
at R. 600, "Do you contend she is a partner?" It is no 
wonder that she didn't know her status and that she 
was confused about it. Pe~hap·s she was confused about 
' the handling of her father's partnership interest; but 
that is not to suggest or admit that she was confused 
in any way in her recollection of the facts of the partner-
ship or anything but methodical in the making and 
keeping of memorandums. 
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ARGUMENT OF THE DEFENDANT AND 
APPELLANT 
The record in this case is unreasonably long for 
the type of problem presented to the Court. The trial 
was a constant struggle between expansion and con-
traction of what was material; and when immaterial 
rna tter came in, it had to be met with the other side of the 
coin lest the Court place some weight upon it. 
And so, in answering appellant's argument, there 
is a practical problem of uncertainty as to what may 
impress the Court and, therefore, call for some expla-
nation or answer. 
This answer to the argument of the appellant will, 
therefore, be limited to a few matters, in the hope that 
we will touch on the ones which may be of some assist-
ance. 
The first argument concerns ""\Vhat agreements 
were made between the partners?" (Brief p. 10). There 
follows an enumeration of nine so-called agreements, 
none of which was given the dignity of the "Partner-
ship Agreement" in the trial of the case. It is true 
that plaintiff made no contention that defendant had 
violated the partnership agreement. Appellant now 
attempts to twist that statement by a wild, confusing, 
illogical, enumeration of eight collateral matters in-
jected by the defendant over the objections of the 
plaintiff, none of ·which was accepted by the Court, 
and all of which are in controverted areas of fact. There 
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was only one partnership agreement in this case and 
that was Exhibit 11-D. This matter was settled during 
the opening statements and discussion, and is abstracted 
at page 10 (R. 280). 
On page 12 of his brief, defendant refers to "The 
solemn admissions of the plaintiff and cross-defendant 
under oath" that salaries were fixed on May 8, 1948, 
at $400.00 and $350.00. The solemn admission of 1\'Irs. 
Chambers was an implied denial. 
"Q. In which the salary of $400.00 a month was 
fixed for your brother and $350.00 was 
fixed for your husband? 
"A. We always fixed Rowe's salary a little more 
because we figured he knew more about that 
particular business than my husband did." 
(Ab. 65, R. 605). 
and Mrs. Chambers later testified directly as to the 
conversation on May 8, 1948, in which she said her 
father was ill and she was not separated from him during 
the entire meeting and that there was no conversation 
at all on that occasion about salaries (R. 1536 to 1538). 
And when Mr. Chambers was asked whether it 
was agreed that the salaries should be $400.00 and 
$350.00 per month, he testified: "Not to my recollec-
tion" (Ab. 100, R. 873). And portions of his depo-
sition were read, where, in a leading question, counsel 
included a conversation of May 8th and the figure of 
$350.00 and $400.00, and Mr. Chambers answered: "I 
believe it was that. His was higher" (Ab. 101, R. 873). 
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But he also testified that he was mistaken as to the 
occasion of the salary discussion. .When asked about 
the salary agreement in May, 1948, he testified: 
"Not at that date, there was nothing men-
tioned about it. 
"Q. Nothing mentioned about that? 
"A. Only one time wages were discussed was out 
at Wood Cross Bank, that was to get a 
loan." (R. 898 not abstracted.) 
And as evidence of that occasion Exhibit 20-P was put 
in evidence. 
At page 13 defendant's brief again refers to lack 
of authority to change salaries, which is commented on at 
page xxxiv hereof. It was for the plaintiff to act directly 
or through his agent in matters concerning the partner-
ship, and he approved at the time and approves now 
the fixing of salaries in the amounts they were shown 
on the record. The formality with which a principal 
authorizes an agent to act, or ratifies the act of an 
agent, is for the principal to decide. 
No exhaustive research has been done on this ques-
tion, since it seems fundamental that Mr. Chambers had 
the right to authorize Mrs. Chambers to be his agent 
in financial transactions and in the management of 
the partnership. It was for him and Mrs. Chambers 
to decide the formality which would be required. The 
agency can be formal or informal, or can be implied 
from words or conduct. See Corpus Juris Secundum, 
TitleAgency Section 23, where it is noted at page 1048 
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that family ties 1nake agency more likely and at page 
1050 that acquiescence may be presumed from silence 
or from permitting the agent to carry on the business. 
A principal is bound where he permits the agent to act 
in his behalf. (Gaines v. A. Fisher Brewing Co., 6 U. 
332, 23 P. 755). Acceptance of benefits is ratification 
of a contract. (Floor v. Mitchell, 86 U. 203, 41 P. 2d 
281 at 287). And ratification with knowledge of what 
has been done relates back to the time when the un-
authorized act or contract was performed or entered 
into. (Jones v. Mutual Crea~nery Co., 81 U. 223, 17 
P. 2d 256 at 259, 85 ALR 908). The evidence is that 
Mr. Chambers discussed these matters with Mrs. Cham-
bers, that he left this part of the business to her, that 
when she had a question in her mind in October, 1958, 
he bolstered her and told her that the salaries were 
proper and lawful and has confirmed and ratified the 
contents of the books and records by his position in the 
dissolution of partnership and in the prosecution of this 
litigation (Ab. 95, 48, 205. R. 826, 483, 1617). 
Page 16 says: "Both general partners rendered 
personal services." This was never disputed, but the 
plaintiff rendered full-time, exhaustive service to the 
partnership, and the defendant served only intermit-
tently and when invited to consider special problems. 
Sims worked hard in the beginning (A b. 51-52), then 
was away on his Kearns enterprise (A b. 80, 120) , and 
never returned to regular work but only to special 
matters (Ab. 52, 66, 74, 117, 118, 197). Defendant 
1 
had extensive interests in his sand and gravel pit, his 
XXXIX 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Travel Batcher Company and his Mountain View Con-
struction Co. Plaintiff on the other hand worked 15 to 
16 hours per day, month in and month out in this busi-
ness (Ab. 239 to 241, Exhibit 67-P). 
Page 20 of brief, defendant schedules some com-
putations of his accountant to show revisions in the 
profit and loss accounts according to accounting stand-
ards ( Ab. 22, R. 334). Plaintiff objected to this testi-
mony as immaterial because there was no issue in it. 
There was no other testimony concerning it and it was, 
and is, immaterial to the issues of the case. Defendant 
attempts to inject it here to prejudice the Court. Re-
gardless of the rate at which salaries were computed, 
the losing business would suffer further paper losses 
because of the salaries. But in this case, the business 
later made money, was worth $250,000.00 in 1955 (Ab. 
54, R. 518, Exhibit 17-P) and has had its best years 
since 1955 according to the net profit account in Exhibit 
1-P. 
Under Point II at page 22, defendant again refuses 
to recognize the issue before the Court by italicizing trial 
on the issue of "express agreement," which has been 
discussed at pages xxx-xxxi of tllis brief. 
At page 24 of his brief, defendant is pleased to 
co1nment that Mrs. Chambers said bookkeeping was 
"way out of his line" (defendant). It is not unusual 
for a substantial business man not to do his own ac· 
counting work and not to prepare his own income tax 
return. But defendant was no ignoramus, and he was 
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no dupe. He kept part of the record in 39-P. He also 
had innumerable opportunities to confer on accounting 
matters with expert persons. Mr. Reimann prepared 
his early tax returns (Ab. 114, R. 1005), conferred on 
tax matters (Ab. 44, R. 456, 457, 458), and represented 
Mr. Sims generally (Ab. 117-118, R. 1023; Ab. 133, 
R. 113). Mr. Evans was an accountant and was suffi-
ciently valuable that Mr. Sims has continued to em-
ploy him (A b. 136, R. 1133) . He had opportunity to 
converse with David N. Beal, a CPA, (Ab. 19, R. 319) 
and did confer with Robert Shirley, a CPA, who pre-
pared his 1955 and 1956 tax returns (Ab. 39, R. 428; 
Ab. 43, R. 453; Ab. 136, R. 1129-1131). Mr. Steiner, 
with 35 years accounting experience, (A b. 46, R. 472) 
was employed by Mr. Sims from December 1, 1955 (R. 
476). Mr. Jorgensen, his father-in-law, was employed 
by the partnership, and was also an accountant (A b. 
32-33, R. 381). He also conferred with Mr. Beckstrom 
of the Internal Revenue Service (Ab. 121, R. 1040). 
He made the divisions of profit in the beginning (A b. 
52, R. 510), and gave some intelligent testimony about 
capital accounts (R. 1363 to 1365, Ab. 165). If ac-
counting was "way out of his line" it was because his 
talents were better employed elsewhere. 
At page 27, defendant's brief repeats the state-
ment, 
"We always fixed Rowe's salary a little more 
because we figured he knew more about the par-
ticular business than my husband did." 
In the beginning this was true as evidenced by 
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Exhibit 21-D, which shows Sims at $1.50 per hour, 
Tal Chambers at $1.25 an hour, Bob Chambers at 
$1.15 an hour and Margaret Chambers at $1.00 per 
hour. The notation on the fourth page of that exhibit 
was put on following a conversation between defendant 
and cross-defendant, in which defendant advised Mrs. 
Chan1bers to pay the note first and to increase the 
capital account for the salaries of Tal and Margaret 
since there wouldn't be money to pay them after paying 
the note (A b. 197, R. 1566) . 
Exhibit 2-P plainly shows $2,000.00 for each of 
the plaintiff and defendant for 1948. This was dis-
cussed with Mr. Beckstrom and l\fr. Sims and possibly 
Mr. Reimann (Ab. 114, R. 1009), and defendant also 
testified that he saw those $2,000.00 entries in Exhibit 
2-P (Ab. 137, R. 1153). 
Another unequal salary that came to defendant's 
attention was the $4,478.00 on the 1951 tax return, 
which was crossed out and changed so that income was 
reported for each of the two general partners. Mrs. 
Chambers testified that she discussed this with Rowe 
and then crossed it out (A b. 72, R. 655), and defendant 
testified that he saw it and discussed it (Ab. 121, R. 
1041 and 1042). Exhibit 22-D shows the same salaries 
for plaintiff and for defendant, and this was discussed 
with defendant in May, 1949. Mr. Chambers testified 
that Mr. Sims' handwriting was on the document (R. 
641, not abstracted). Since the amount of time spent 
by the two partners in the business was so dispropor-
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tionate, the approximate hourly rate was certainly the 
most appropriate and undoubtedly would have been 
continued had both partners continued to work in the 
business. The unevenness of the salaries is no problem 
under the partnership agreement since Paragraph 
XIII contemplates that the capital accounts may be-
come unequal through contributions of capital or 
services. 
Page 27 of the defendant's brief accuses Mrs. 
Chambers of "secretly" putting salaries on an hourly 
basis. This accusation has substance only in the minds 
of defendant and his counsel. Defendant testified he 
did absolutely nothing to inform himself as to the salary 
account. Testimony is that he received statements, held 
numerous conferences, Mrs. Chambers attempted to 
discuss matters with him, the books and records were 
always open and available, and even though he lived 
next door, he testified he didn't bother to obtain any 
inforination. These matters were detailed with reference 
to the records at pages 23 to 34 of this brief. 
On page 32 defendant's brief decries Mr. Chambers' 
"huge salary" of $11,700.00 per year. A salary is large 
or small in comparison with surrounding circumstances. 
Mrs. Chambers questioned this salary at first and then 
upon computation of hours worked and rate per hour 
as compared with other employees, concluded that it 
was a reasonable salary (A b. 90, R. 782-783). If 
plaintiff worked 15 hours a day, 6 days a week, he 
would work 4,680 hours a year or $2.50 per hour. The 
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business grew from 13,071 cubic yards in 1948 to 42,709 
in 1955, when it was worth $250,000.00 (Ab. 57, R. 
533) and to 55,704 cubic yards in 1958 (Ab. 49, R. 
487) . According to Exhibit 1-P, Account Net Profits, 
the profits distributed were $10,781.74 in 1956 and 
slightly less than that in other years with $19,127.00 
to each partner in 1958, (R. 41) on an original invest-
ment of a few thousand dollars. The gross receipts 
in 1958 were $686,683.05 (Exhibit 1-P, Amount No. 
801) compared to $100,163.73 in 1948 (Exhibit 44-D). 
Defendant's salary from just one of his other enter-
prises was $11,000.00in each of 1957 and 1958 (R. 42). 
By what standard of comparison does the defend-
ant call this plaintiff manager's salary "huge"? 
At page 35 defendant's brief says that Exhibits 
21-D and 22-D "escaped destruction" and then cites 
a case involving "willful destruction, suppression, alter-
ation, or fabrication of documentary evidence." De-
fendant and his counsel spent so much time on insinu-
ation, accusation, and examination of witnesses about 
destruction of records and failure to produce records 
that the Court gave him a chance to prove and found 
not one scintilla of evidence to support the elaborate 
accusations. At R. 167 to 169, the Court said: 
"To clear the record, then the Court will hear 
no further evidence on the motions of defendant 
R. W. Sims filed April 21, 1961, and the Court 
finds from the evidence on the sampling of these 
motions, no scintilla of evidence developed as 
indicating that the plaintiff or the cross-defend· 
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ant has willfully, intentionally, purposely de-
stroyed or concealed or refused to deliver records 
and that there is not evidence nor a scintilla of 
evidence produced by their sampling of the mo-
tion of an intent to willfully and intentionally 
defraud the court." (A b. 319, R. 23, 28-29). 
By what weird process defendant's counsel justified 
themselves in saying at page 36, "Mrs. Chambers ad-
mittedly altered Exhibit 17 -P behind the back of her 
brother by adding 'Wages M. & T.' after the figures 
of $56,865.15" is difficult to _comprehend. She testified 
specifically that those words were written on during 
the conversation with her brother on March 7, 1956, 
and that only the pencil figures were her own notations 
n1ade afterwards. When the exhibit was offered in 
evidence, Mrs. Chambers testified that the figures 
$56,856.15 were in her handwriting and the figures on 
the right hand side were in the handwriting of her 
brother and then that below the word "Notes" there 
are some pencilled words in her handwriting which were 
not written during the conversation (R. 540). We 
asked to erase the pencil markings to which there was 
objection, so the pencil markings were left on. Then 
this question : 
" Now there are a number of other markings 
on this exhibit, were those other markings 
made during the conversation? 
"A. Yes. There is an asterisk that was referring 
from the $56,866.15 down to the figure just 
like it in the other-down in th lower part, 
and it says: 'Wages, Margaret and Tal.' 
xlv 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Q. Well, did 1\'Ir. Sims say anything about 
that? 
"A. 'I' hat the wages would be paid before the 
split of the other assets." (R. 541, abstracted 
in part at p. 58). 
Then on cross-examination, counsel for defendant 
asked Mrs. Chambers if she mentioned "because our 
salary and share of the profit had been plowed back 
into the business" and she answered that she wasn't sure 
of the word "salaries" (A b. 84, R. 729). There was no 
specific cross-examination as to the part that says: 
'""Wages M. & T." And in the examination of Mr. Sims, 
his attention was directed to Exhibit 17-P as abstracted 
at page 128, R. 1081. The question was: 
"Now I call your attention, Mr. Sims, to a 
notation on this document over on the side, 
the figure '56,865.15'. There is the notation 
Wages M. & T.', was that put on in your 
presence? 
"A. Not that I recall. This is made up with a 
pen." 
It is obvious that at that point both the Court and 
counsel for plaintiff mistook the words about which 
counsel was interrogating Mr. Sims for the pencil 
notations referred to in the previous question, which 
were made in pencil and which counsel offered to strike 
from the exhibit, and that mistake is made plain from 
the following comments: 
"Mr. Bird: Now if the Court please, I regard 
that as a ridiculous question. We ask that that 
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be stricken, because Mrs. Chambers testified 
that those were her words and she put them on 
later, and counsel refused to let them be stricken. 
They said she wanted them on. Now he is ap-
parently attempting to impeach our case by 
showing that those words were not there at the 
time, and I ask how ridiculous can we be. 
"Mr. Reimann: If he says now that they were 
put on later, I will accept that statement. 
"Mr. Bird: I said so at the tillte, and Mrs. 
Chambers so testified, and we wanted to strike 
them and counsel refused to let them be stricken. 
"Mr. Reimann: That isn't the way I remem-
ber. 
"The Court: It is my recollection of the testi-
mony to the effect that they were added at a 
later date, Mr. Reimann. 
"Mr. Reimann: But she was-and that they 
were not added in the presence of Mr. Sims. 
"Mr. Bird: And we asked to have them stricken 
and counsel refused. 
"Mr. Reimann: There is a cross mark and fol-
lowing that the word is 'Wages, M. & T.' " (R. 
1081-1082). 
and counsel then went on to other matters. 
It is, therefore, plain that Mrs. Chambers' testi-
mony was not withdrawn, and she plainly testified that 
those words "Wages M. & T." were put on during the 
conversation and in ink. It was counsel and the Court 
who were mistaken as to -what words were put on in 
pencil, and furthermore the words "behind the back 
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of her brother" had no justification whatever. As to 
the pencil markings on the exhibit, 1\Irs. Chambers 
frankly testified that they were put on afterwards and 
for her own information (R. 539, 540). But as to the 
portions written in ink, her testimony was definite that 
they were written during the conversation. 
One of the problems in trying a long case is the 
recollection of precise testimony given by the witnesses. 
This was just an instance of faulty recollection by one 
counsel and by the Court. The point was put in issue 
by the conflicting testimony with counsel's statement; 
but the nature of t~e ink and the appearance of the 
document all favor the testimony of Mrs. Chambers. 
And her pencil notations were admittedly put on by 
her later. 
And at the same page of the brief, it is stated that 
Mrs. Chambers "falsely represented to Mr. Sims that 
$56,865.15 was the balance of the Chambers capital 
account in excess of the Sims account." The difference 
in capital accounts as shown in Exhibit 1-P at the end 
of 1955 is $53,291.71. The difference on the tax return, 
13-P, is $62,538.99, which was made after the adjust-
ment of the depreciation account by Mr. Shirley and 
19-P shows the increase of income by some $7,000.00. 
Exhibit 13-P is undated, and it is reasonable to assume 
that on March 7, 1956, the date of the making of Ex-
hibits 16-P and 17-P (Ab. 55, R. 522) a different figure 
had been computed by Mr. Evans using the profit and 
loss statement, which is 19-P. Defendant did not go 
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into this matter at the trial, and it was, therefore, not 
possible to have Mr. Evans reconstruct the figure of 
$56,856.15. But there is no support whatever for the 
charge that it was falsely represented by Mrs. Cham-
bers. 
At page 47, the defendant again harps on the re-
frain "that there is an express agreement" which has 
previous been referred to. Some people believe that 
if you say a thing often enough and loud enough, it 
will gain acceptance regardless of its truth. 
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